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ARTICLE

JUSTICIABILITY AND THE ROLE OF
COURTS IN ADEQUACY LITIGATION:
PRESERVING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO EDUCATION
Julia A. Simon-Kerr & Robynn K. Sturmt
In the first study of opinions handed down in education adequacy litigation
between January2005 and January2008, this Article shows a marked shift away
from outcomesfavorable to adequacyplaintifs. Following two decades in which
courts spurredsignificantreforms in our nation'sneediest schools by interpreting
the education clauses of their state constitutions to guarantee an "adequate"
educationfor all students, the years 2005 to 2008 have seen a dramatic change in
the judicial response to adequacy litigation. Through an analysis of the latest
body of cases, we show that separationof powers concerns have begun to drive
state courts out of this importantavenue of education reform. These separationof
powers concerns have become more salient as litigators pressure courts to
mandate concrete remedies that would trump legislative discretion. The most
problematicsuch remedy is one that would requirecourts to order the legislature
to make specific budgetary allocations. This negative trend for adequacy
plaintiffs spans courts seeing adequacy claims for the first time and those
presidingover a second round of adequacy litigation. We argue that despite this
shift, recent courts have not wholly disavowed their role in substantiatingthe
state constitutional right to education. Courts remain willing to act as a
constitutionalcheck on the legislature's actions within the field of education if
plaintifs canfind a way to respond to concerns over remedies. We examine the
nature of and reasonsfor courts' increasingseparationof powers concerns and
then briefly explore what lessons adequacyplaintiffs might take awayfor use in
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INTRODUCTION

Over the last two decades, state courts have spurred significant reforms in
our nation's neediest schools. Interpreting the right to education enshrined in
every state constitution, state courts have demanded that their executive and
legislative branches take action to guarantee an "adequate" education for all of
their state's students, not just those lucky enough to live in well-funded school
districts. By applying pressure for legislative and court-ordered improvements,
"education adequacy" litigation has achieved huge reforms in education
funding across the country.
From 2005-2008, however, state courts have delivered a string of
disappointing decisions to adequacy plaintiffs. While those courts have
articulated a variety of state-specific rationales for rejecting adequacy claims,
their opinions reveal a common concern with the boundaries between their
judicial role and the prerogatives of the legislature.
Education adequacy suits have challenged courts to enforce not only
suitable education standards in their states, but, more generally, to find a
suitable role for themselves in education reform.' The prospect of interfering in
an area that is traditionally seen as a legislative prerogative-such as education

1. Cf Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, "Meaningful" Educational Opportunity, and the
Necessary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1538 (2007) (commenting that courts
have felt compelled to take jurisdiction over education advocacy suits due to ineffective
action on the part of the legislative and executive branches).
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policy-makes judges especially uneasy.2 At the same time, state judiciaries
are reluctant to abandon completely this affirmative constitutional right to a
political process prone to fail those children who are most in need.3 Between
1989 and 2005, the tension between these dueling concerns was generally
resolved in favor of adequacy plaintiffs, who won more than seventy-five
percent of the cases.4
As the adequacy movement matures, however, the balance between
deference and action by courts in adequacy suits has begun to tip toward
deference and away from judicial intervention. In fact, since 2005, adequacy
plaintiffs struggled to surmount the courts' unease with adjudicating these
cases. Plaintiffs' adequacy claims were dismissed before ever reaching trial in
nine of the nineteen decisions handed down between 2005 and 2008.s By
contrast, only five courts had refused to hear adequacy claims in the preceding
sixteen years. The supreme courts of Texas and Massachusetts both reversed
lower-court rulings in favor of adequacy plaintiffs, finding instead that current
school systems met constitutional standards despite obvious and continued
disparities and failures. 7 Similarly, in South Carolina and Alaska, trial courts
rejected claims that the school systems in their states suffered as a result of
inadequate funding.8 And, despite prior findings that the constitution demanded
2. See infra note 166.

3. Cf Ian Millhiser, What Happens to a Dream Deferred?: Cleansing the Taint of San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 55 DUKE L.J. 405, 406 (2005) (arguing
that because political branches are structurally ill-suited to protect the affirmative right to an
adequate education, "'judicial restraint' leaves undereducated Americans without recourse to
any branch of government"); Larry J. Obhof, Rethinking JudicialActivism and Restraint in
State School Finance Litigation, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 569, 573-75 (2004) (discussing
structural disincentives for the political branches to adequately fund schools or reform the
school finance system absent external pressure).
4. Between 1989 and 2005, plaintiffs prevailed in twenty of twenty-five final decisions
of the highest state courts or unappealed trial court decisions. See National Access Network,
School Funding "Adequacy" Decisions Since 1989 (Oct. 2006) (on file with author).
5. See Crane Elementary Sch. Dist. v. State, No. ICA-CV 04-0076, slip op. at 27
(Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2006); Lobato v. State, No. 05 CV 4794 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Mar. 2,
2006) (order granting motion to dismiss); Carroll-Hall v. Rell, No. X09CV054019406, 2007
WL 2938295 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 17, 2007); Bonner v. Daniels, No. 49D01604PL016414
(Ind. Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2007) (order granting motion to dismiss); Young v. Williams, Nos.
03-CI-00055 & 03-CI-01 152 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Feb. 13, 2007) (order granting motion for
summary judgment); Comm. for Educ. Equal. v. State, No. 04CV 323022 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Aug.
29, 2007) (order dismissing adequacy-related claims); Neb. Coal. for Educ. Equity &
Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164 (Neb. 2007); Okla. Educ. Ass'n v. State, 158 P.3d
1058 (Okla. 2007); Pendleton Sch. Dist. 16R v. State, 185 P.3d 471, 477-78 (Or. Ct. App.
2008). aff'd in part,rev'd in part, 200 P.3d 133 (Ore. 2009).
6. See e.g., Ex parte James, 836 So. 2d 813 (Ala. 2002); Coal. for Adequacy and
Fairness in Sch. Funding v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1996); Comm. for Educ. Rights v.
Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178 (111.1996); Marrero v. Commonwealth, 739 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1999);
City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40 (R.I. 1995).
7. See Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1155-57 (Mass. 2005); Neeley
v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 792-93 (Tex. 2005).
8. See Moore v. State, No. 3AN-04-9756, slip op. at 194-95 (Alaska Super. Ct. June
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increased school funding, the highest courts in New York and Kansas largely
left their legislatures to judge for themselves how much funding is enough.9
This backwards trend in adequacy suits comes in the face of developments
that would seem to bode well for the movement. Despite ever more mobilized
opposition,' 0 adequacy plaintiffs could reasonably expect to be more successful
as adequacy litigation strategies were perfected and they were able to build on
prior precedent establishing both the justiciability of these cases and the
substance of state constitutional rights to education. The Improving America's
Schools Act of 1994 and the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 demonstrate the
rise of the accountability movement." This "New Accountability" movement
introduced education standards that were expected to encourage judicial
supervision of education reform by giving substance to the constitutional right
and shielding courts from attacks of judicial caprice.12
Having acknowledged the critical role the judiciary must play to protect
every child's right to education, and in the face of new standards that help
substantiate the adequacy of an education, why did courts begin-at all stages
of adequacy litigation-bowing out of education reform? Given the
overwhelming shift in courts' responses to their lawsuits, this is a question all
current adequacy plaintiffs must confront.
The answer is both straightforward and deeply troubling from the
perspective of future litigants. A close reading of the most recent adequacy
decisions finds judges expressing a surprisingly unified concern: state courts
across the country are ill at ease with the role they have been cast in modem
adequacy litigation-a role they increasingly fear may run afoul of traditional
separation of powers precepts.
By 2005, many state courts had already ruled in favor of judicial review in
education cases, and recent events have seen no dramatic facial reversals of this
precedent. Superficially, only four recent courts explicitly dismissed adequacy
claims as nonjusticiable. Yet, even the claims disposed of on other grounds
were victims of the same overarching justiciability concerns: judges refused to
grant plaintiffs relief for fear that adequacy suits have forced courts over the
boundary separating the judiciary from other branches of government. In fact, a
close reading of 2005-2008 case law makes clear that core justiciability
concerns are not only pervasive, but often decisive. For example, the Supreme
21, 2007); Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 539 (S.C. 1999)
(overturning a trial court decision that the state's education clause "imposes no qualitative
standards").
9. See Montoy v. State, 138 P.3d 755, 763-64 (Kan. 2006); Campaign for Fiscal Equity
v. State (CFE Ill), 861 N.E.2d 50, 58-59 (N.Y. 2006).
10. In response to the initial string of adequacy victories, states began to seek external
expertise and share best practices for how to mount an effective defense to this novel claim.
I1. See, e.g., James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act,
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 937-39 (2004).
12. See James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, The FederalNo Child Left Behind Act
and the Post-DesegregationCivil Rights Agenda, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1703, 1718-20 (2003).
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Court of Texas vigorously defended the court's duty to determine the
constitutionality of the public school system at the same time that it cited
3
separation of powers concerns in upholding the state's school finance system.1
In the same vein, a Connecticut trial court paid lip service to that state's
binding precedent that the courts must enforce, and thereby delineate, the state
constitution's education guarantee, but imported a classic justiciability analysis
under another name in order to dismiss the adequacy portion of a recent suit.14
And finally, even as the chief justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts used neither the words "separation of powers" nor
"justiciability" in writing for the plurality dismissing an adequacy suit, the logic
of her argument was driven by a keen sense of the judiciary's limited role in
matters such as education that involve the state budget and other primarily
15
legislative concerns.
Education advocates must confront the reality of this shifting pendulum in
adequacy suits. The state constitutional right to education is a powerful tool. It
has done much to improve education in schools across the country. It has been
a critical means for advocates to ensure educational opportunities for those who
would be otherwise left behind by the political process. Yet the state
constitutional right to education is in danger of being rendered meaningless,
even as recent decisions leave it superficially intact. The modem education
adequacy litigation formula, particularly to the extent that it portrays adequacy
as a pot of money, threatens to foreclose future causes of action under state
6
education clauses as courts set broad and unfavorable precedent.'
This result is not inevitable. While expressing discomfort with the demands
of recent litigation, courts have not wholly disavowed their role in
13. See Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 782-83

(Tex. 2005).
14. Carroll-Hall v. Rell, No. X09CV054019406, 2007 WL 2938295 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Sept. 17, 2007).
15. See infra Subpart II.A.I.
16. Strong nonjusticiability precedent may foreclose not only alternative forms of
adequacy claims under state education clauses, but also equity claims. Further, even if courts
carefully preserve judicial review of the school system under the state equal protection
clause, there is no consensus that equal protection claims alone can achieve the necessary
reform. This is why advocates turned to adequacy initially. First, equity simply may not be
enough: it costs more money to educate students with greater needs, such as bilingual or atrisk students. It has yet to be seen whether courts will go beyond horizontal equity to
embrace a theory of "vertical equity." See EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE:

ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES (Helen F. Ladd, Rosemary Chalk, & Janet S. Hansen, eds., 1999)
(describing basic concepts of horizontal and vertical equity in the education context).
Second, education advocates turned their energy toward adequacy suits in part because
equity suits received a lukewarm welcome in state courts. See James E. Ryan, Schools, Race,
and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 268 (1999-2000). Finally, from a practical perspective,
equity suits may be less conducive to sparking reform by the political branches. Whereas
adequacy suits are seen as a fight for better schools for all children, equity suits tend to pit
the poor against the wealthy thereby impeding political progress. To the extent that adequacy
campaigns are truly won in the court of public opinion this is an important consideration.
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substantiating the state constitutional right to education. Thus, there is reason to
believe that courts remain willing to act as a constitutional check on
legislatures' actions within the field of education, if only plaintiffs can find a
way to respond to courts' concerns. In order to initiate that vital conversation,
this Article examines the adequacy decisions delivered between January 2005
and January 2008 to better understand the nature of and reason for the
increased separation of powers concerns expressed therein. It then briefly
explores what lessons adequacy plaintiffs might take away for use in future
litigation.
Part I provides a short overview of the origins and evolution of education
adequacy litigation. It focuses on those aspects of the historical context that
help illuminate the challenges modern adequacy litigants currently face.
Part II turns to the adequacy decisions delivered between January 2005 and
January 2008. It argues that over those three years, increasing separation of
powers concerns began to drive state courts out of an important avenue of
education reform. These separation of powers concerns became more salient as
courts are increasingly pushed by maturing cases and litigation strategies
centering on specific monetary demands-toward mandating concrete remedies
at the expense of legislatures' discretion. The most alarming such remedy for
courts is the one that will require them to order legislatures to make specific
budgetary allocations. Judges' natural distaste for budgetary intervention was
aggravated by newly converging factors such as increasingly proactive
legislative involvement in the area of school funding, evidence of improving
schools, and growing doubts that money alone can transform those schools that
continue to struggle. In addition, courts were functioning against a new
backdrop: the aftermath of judicial intervention in other jurisdictions. Although
adequacy suits have done much to increase funding, improve schools, and draw
attention to the children left behind by the political process, Courts looking to
other states also see interminable litigation, ever-growing demands from
plaintiffs, and tension-fraught showdowns between the judiciary and
legislatures.
Part II groups courts' predominant concerns in adequacy opinions from
2005-2008 into three categories. First, the maturation of the adequacy
movement poses new remedial challenges. During the initial waves of
adequacy litigation, courts could be responsive to plaintiffs merely by adopting
a traditional judicial role: they could declare the constitutional right and leave
the legislature to design a remedy. Recent evidence suggests that second
generation cases-in which plaintiffs press the legislature for further reformmay force courts to make a difficult choice between aggressive judicial
intervention and total abdication of the issue to the legislature. Particularly
when a legislature has made an effort at education reform, it would be empty
formalism for a court simply to issue a declaratory judgment that the system
17. See, e.g., Rebell, supra note 1,at 1527-28.
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continues to be unconstitutional. Without a more concrete remedial order, the
legislature could simply continue making its own best faith effort at
improvement, even if that effort falls far short of a constitutional minimum.
Further, the very success of early education suits and the reforms they
engendered may be a barrier to continued success. Whereas courts confidently
intervened in the face of legislatures that had clearly abdicated their
constitutional duties to provide a rational system of education, they are less
willing to order remedial action that would interfere with legislative
appropriations when the plight of school children in their state is no longer as
dire.
Second, separation of powers concerns were exacerbated by litigation
strategies increasingly focused on appropriations as the benchmark and remedy
for an inadequate education. Adequacy suits have always fought for more
resources. But this fight began to center on specific funding levels rather than
more systemic reforms. This shift in emphasis implies to courts that any
outcome favoring plaintiffs must entail explicitly ordering the legislature to
spend more money, something every court is hesitant to do. When faced with
an either/or proposition, courts have chosen to find for defendants rather than
grant a funding-centered remedy. Moreover, courts are even less likely to
intrude into a legislature's budget allocations if-as is increasingly the case
they doubt that more money alone can solve the problem.
And finally, these separation of powers concerns are contagious. Many
2005-2008 opinions echo the justiciability arguments of sister states. As courts
weigh the benefits of engaging their coercive power against the risk of diluting
their own legitimacy or encroaching on another branch's prerogatives, recent
experiences in other states are a primary source of guidance. With more
precedent to look to, courts have seemed to find much to dissuade them from
substantively entering the fray. Thus, both recent out-of-state opinions and the
aftermath of prior in-state adequacy decisions have shaped the latest adequacy
outcomes.
I. ADEQUACY LITIGATION'S ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION: A SHORT
INTRODUCTION TO MODERN CHALLENGES

Though this Article focuses primarily on the latest education adequacy
litigation, we begin with a brief overview of education litigation in the United
States. This cursory review is meant only to flag those aspects of the historical
context that shed light on the challenges faced by modem adequacy litigation.
The origins and evolution of adequacy litigation are treated in greater detail
elsewhere.' 8

18. E.g., Michael A. Rebell, Educational Adequacy, Democracy, and the Courts, in
ACHIEVING HIGH EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS FOR ALL 218 (Timothy Ready et al. eds., 2001);

Ryan, supra note 16.
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A. The First Wave: The U.S. Constitution and Equal Protection
Scholars typically describe the history of education litigation in three
waves. In the first wave of education litigation, plaintiffs sought justice in
federal courts under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution. The seminal case during this genesis period was San Antonio v.
Rodriguez.19 While the public education received by Demetrio Rodriguez in
the Edgewood Independent School District in 1968 was inferior to the
education available in wealthier Texas districts by almost any measure, 20 the
plaintiffs' litigation strategy focused specifically on the inequity of the school
finance system. Due to its heavy reliance on local property taxes, the school
finance system generated gross disparities in funding between poor and rich
school districts. In contrast to disparities in educational opportunity or
academic achievement, disparities in per-pupil funding were the most direct,
unmitigated evidence of state abdication of the responsibility to educate all
children, offering plaintiffs what seemed to be the strongest case that Rodriguez
had been denied equal protection under the laws.
While a federal district court found for the plaintiffs in Rodriguez, a
divided Supreme Court reversed. Notwithstanding the dissent's accusation that
they were leaving "appellees to the vagaries of [a] political process which ...
has proved singularly unsuited to the task of providing a remedy," 2 1 the
Supreme Court held that, because education is not a fundamental right under
the Federal Constitution, the Texas school financing plan would only be subject
22
to rational basis review. Under that lenient standard, the Court found the
dramatic disparities created by the Texas funding scheme to be rationally
related to the legitimate state interests in "assuring basic education" while
permitting and encouraging local control of schools. 23 Thus, Demetrio
Rodriguez had to seek justice elsewhere.
B. The Second Wave: State Courts and Equal Protection
In the so-called second wave of education litigation, plaintiffs across the
country turned to the state courts for relief. Advocates hoped that state courtsbolstered by explicit education clauses in their state constitutions-could be
convinced to depart from federal equal protection precedent, declare education
a fundamental right, and subject school finance schemes to strict scrutiny.24

19. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973).
20. See, e.g., J. Steven Farr & Mark Trachtenberg, The Edgewood Drama: An Epic
Questfor Education Equity, 17 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 607, 607-09 (1999).
21. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 71 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
22. Id at 54-55.
23. Id. at 49.
24. This strategy proved successful in a handful of early cases but was disappointing
overall. For a comprehensive discussion, see Ryan, supra note 16, at 266-69.
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Following this second wave strategy, in 1984, the Rodriguez plaintiffs filed
Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby (Edgewood I).25 In addition to
bringing an equity claim, this time under the Texas constitution's equal rights
provision, the Edgewood I plaintiffs also challenged the school finance system
under the "efficiency" mandate of the Texas education clause.26 Article VII,
Section I of the Texas constitution provides: "A general diffusion of
knowledge being essential to the preservation of the liberties and rights of the
people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State to establish and make
suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of
public free schools."
In a victory for plaintiffs, the Texas Supreme Court responded by striking
down the school finance system as unconstitutional under the education
clause, 27 holding that "efficiency" required that districts "have substantially
equal access to similar revenues per pupil at similar levels of tax effort."28 The
court declined altogether to address plaintiffs' claim under the state's equal
protection clause, perhaps for many of the same reasons that had left the
Supreme Court in Rodriguez so divided.2 9
Although the Texas Supreme Court relied on the education clause in
Edgewood I, it explicitly struck down the school finance system under a theory
of equity. 30 The Court read the "efficiency" language in the education clause to
demand "substantially equal access to similar revenues per pupil at similar
levels of tax effort." 31 Although this holding presages the idea that state
education clauses contain a substantive component, 32 neither the court nor the
plaintiffs conceptualized the theory as one of adequacy. 33 In fact, "adequacy"
would not make its first appearance before the Texas Supreme Court until it
34
was raised sua sponte by Justice Comyn six years later in Edgewood IV. And
25. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood 1), 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
26. Id. at 392-93.
27. Id. at 392.
28. Id. at 397.
29. Id. at 398. See, e.g., Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 20 at 642 (explaining that
"the fact that each school district serves both poor and wealthy kids, or both white and
brown kids, muddles the [equal protection] claim that the discrimination is aimed at one
identifiable group.").
30. Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d at 397. Farr and Trachtenberg explain that because the
line between equity and adequacy is conceptually blurry, "adequacy" concerns "filtered
through the court's language" even though "Edgewood I dealt primarily with the equity
issue." Supra note 19, at 645.
31. Edgewoodl, 777 S.W.2d at 397.
32. Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 19, at 645 ("The reason so many people were
concerned with the inequities perpetuated by the Texas school-finance system was that the
schoolchildren in the poorer districts received a substandard education.").
33. See, e.g., id. at 644-45 (articulating the reasons why plaintiffs had rejected an
"adequacy" claim in favor of "equity").
34. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 729-30 (Tex. 1995)
[hereinafter Edgewood IV]. The Texas Supreme Court struck down the public school finance
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plaintiffs themselves did not bring adequacy claims before the justices until
2005, when Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consolidated Independent School
Districtreached the Texas Supreme Court.35
This history in Texas underscores the extent to which adequacy litigation
was shaped by its development from early equal protection claims based on
school finance inequities. In many ways, the litigation strategy was driven by
innovative public interest lawyers navigating evolving doctrine. Education
reform litigation began with equity in part because it started with the Federal
Constitution. Although the large majority of state constitutions explicitly
protect the right to an "adequate," "thorough," or "efficient" education-and
not the right to funding-early adequacy claims predominantly challenged the
schoolfinance system specifically, in large part because such claims were often
bundled with equity challenges that had long focused on funding as the most
strategic measure of equality.36 Another reason for the initial focus on funding
is the tradition of local control over education. 37 Historically, a state's major
influence on schooling came from the provision of funds, so it is not surprising
that plaintiffs seeking systemic change would choose inequitable funding as an
avenue to get at systemic, statewide problems. The ultimate shift from equity
litigation to adequacy litigation has been at times something of an ad hoc
process, driven as much by the preferences of the bench as by education
plaintiffs.38
system twice more in Edgewood II and Edgewood III. In Edgewood II, Edgewood Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991), the court unanimously dismissed the latest
legislation as little more than a band-aid. However, by Edgewood III Carrollton-Farmers
Branch Independent School District v. Edgewood Independent School District, 826 S.W.2d
489, 502 (Tex.1992), the court's unanimous front had begun to break under mounting
political pressure. In Edgewood IV, Justice Cornyn limited the demands of equity by
introducing the concept of adequacy: districts need not have "substantially equal revenue for
substantially equal tax effort at all levels offunding." 917 S.W.2d at 730. Instead, the State
need only equalize resources up to a constitutional minimum-"a general diffusion of
knowledge." Carrollton-FarmersBranch Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489 at 494. Wealthy
districts remain free to supplement state funding with local funds as long as the entire system
remains financially efficient.
35. See Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. 176 S.W.3d 746, 753
(Tex. 2005).
36. Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directionsin School FinanceReform,
48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 125-26 (1995).

37. The most recent decision in Oregon's adequacy litigation signaled this concern. In
rejecting part of the plaintiffs adequacy claim as foreclosed by precedent, the court cited
Olsen v. State, which found that while the Oregon constitution "provides for a minimum of
educational opportunities in the district," it "permits the districts to exercise local control
over what they desire, and can furnish, over the minimum." Pendleton Sch. Dist. v. State,
185 P.3d 471, 478 (Or. Ct. App. 2005), affd in part, rev'd in part, 200 P.3d 133 (Or. 2009)
(quoting Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139, 148 (Or. 1976)). The Pendleton court noted that
beyond the basic "opportunities," Olsen was not about adequacy but was merely a statement
that the state constitution required some measure of uniformity of education. Id.
38. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 16, at 268-69 ("The shift in focus from equality to
adequacy is in some cases a matter of choice or strategy, and in other cases it is a matter of
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C. The Third Wave: Kentucky and the Birth of Adequacy
Scholars have labeled Kentucky the "birthplace" of the adequacy
movement and the third wave of education litigation.39 Just one year after the
Rodriguez plaintiffs filed their lawsuit in Texas state court, a coalition of public
school students, sixty-six local school districts, and a handful of boards of
education in Kentucky followed with their own suit. 40 The constitutional
education clause in Kentucky, like its counterpart in Texas, requires the
General Assembly to provide an "efficient" system of public schools.41 Thus,
as in Texas, plaintiffs in Rose v. Councilfor Better Education, 790 S.W.2d 186
(Ky. 1989), challenged the school finance system under not only the Equal
Protection and Due Process clauses, but also under the state constitution's
education clause. In Kentucky, however, in addition to challenging the school
finance system, the plaintiffs also claimed that the entire public school system
was unconstitutional under the state constitution's efficiency mandate.42 In a
landmark decision, the Supreme Court of Kentucky struck down the school
system under the education clause of the Kentucky constitution. Aware of the
revolutionary nature of its decision, the court made its holding as clear as
possible:
Lest there be any doubt, the result of our decision is that Kentucky's entire
system of common schools is unconstitutional.

..

. This decision applies to the

entire sweep of the system-all its parts and parcels. This decision applies to
the statutes creating, implementing and financing the system and to all
regulations, etc., pertaining thereto. This decision covers the creation of local
school districts, school boards, and the Kentucky Department of Education to
the Minimum Foundation Program and Power Equalization Program. It covers
school construction and maintenance, teacher certification-the whole gamut
43
of the common school system in Kentucky.
Echoing the themes of equality running through earlier decisions, such as
Edgewood I, the Rose court held that, under section 183, "[e]ach child, every
child, in this Commonwealth must be provided with an equal opportunity to
have an adequate education." 44 But, by including the word "adequate," the
court went even further, to hold that the education clause guaranteed not only
equality, but also a certain quality of education. Specifically, the court found a
school system could only pass constitutional muster if-at a minimum-it

necessity, as litigants who have already lost on an equality claim return to court for a second
or third time.").
39. See, e.g., ERIC HANUSHEK, COURTING FAILURE: How SCHOOL FINANCE LAWSUITS
EXPLOIT JUDGES' GOOD INTENTIONS AND HARM OUR CHILDREN XV (2006) ("Kentucky is
usually identified as the birthplace of the modem era of [adequacy] cases.").
40. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Ky. 1989).
41. KY. CONST. § 183.
42. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 190-91.

43. Id. at 215.
44. Id. at 211.
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aimed to provide all children with the capacities it deemed necessary to enable
students to "function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization," to
"understand the [political] issues that affect his or her community, state, and
nation," and to "compete favorably. . . in the job market."45
While its opinion went beyond merely thinking about education in terms of
funding, the court did specifically mandate that the General Assembly provide
sufficient funding for an adequate education for all. Significantly, the court left
the determination of how best to achieve a constitutionally efficient funding
system to the legislature, emphasizing: "We do not instruct the General
Assembly to enact any specific legislation. We do not direct the members of the
General Assembly to raise taxes.. . . We only determine the intent of the
framers. Carrying-out that intent is the duty of the General Assembly." 46 The
General Assembly responded to Rose by immediately enacting sweeping
reforms under the Kentucky Education Reform Act (KERA). 47
The Rose vision was subsequently adopted and cited by courts in at least
48
seven other states.48 For example, in McDuffr v. Secretary of the Executive
Office of Education, a case discussed in greater depth in Part II.A, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court unequivocally held that children in the
Commonwealth are constitutionally entitled to an education that will provide
them with the seven capacities set forth by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in
Rose, and that will prepare them to take their place as knowledgeable and
productive citizens. 49 As in Kentucky, the Massachusetts legislature responded
by rapidly enacting significant reforms that injected "enormous amounts of new

45. Id. at 212 ("[A]n efficient system of education must have as its goal to provide
each and every child with at least the seven following capacities: (i) sufficient oral and
written communication skills to enable students to function in a complex and rapidly
changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to
enable the student to make informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmental
processes to enable the student to understand the issues that affect his or her community,
state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and
physical wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his
or her cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation for advanced
training in either academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose and
pursue life work intelligently; and (vii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to
enable public school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding
states, in academics or in the job market.").
46. Id.
47. See Molly A. Hunter, All Eyes Forward: Public Engagement and Educational
Reform in Kentucky, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 485, 498 (1999).
48. See Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 485 (Ark. 2002);
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997); see also Opinion of
the Justices No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107, 144 (Ala. 1993); Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. State,
885 P.2d 1170, 1185 (Kan. 1994); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997);
Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540 (S.C. 1999); Carrollton-Farmers
Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489, 527-28 (Tex.
1992).
49. 615 N.E.2d 516, 548, 554 (Mass. 1993).
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money"so and "revolutionized public education in Massachusetts."
Crucially, early cases such as Edgewood I, Rose, and McDuffy did not
initially force courts to wrestle with the boundaries of the separation of powers
doctrine. Rather, those courts were able to trigger a legislative response while
remaining well within the traditional bounds of judicial power: they declared
the education system unconstitutional, defined the basic contours of the right to
education, and left the legislature to devise reforms to bring the school system
into compliance. Most courts have followed this formula and left the specifics
of reform up to their legislatures. 52
II. GROWING JUSTICIABILITY CONCERNS: ADEQUACY LITIGATION FROM 20052008
The years 2005 through 2008 witnessed a sea change in judicial attitudes
toward education adequacy claims. Despite growing momentum, the benefit of
lessons learned in previous litigation, favorable precedent, and more
sophisticated costing-out methodologies, recent adequacy plaintiffs have almost
universally encountered a judiciary reluctant to entertain their claims or to offer
them meaningful remediation.53 A close reading of these recent opinions finds
50. Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1151 (Mass. 2005) (quoting lower

court).
51. Id. at 1144.
52. See Molly S. McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education: Economic
Integrationofthe Public Schools, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1334, 1348 (2004) ("State courts have
been loath to clarify the full content of the rights they recognize or to prescribe for state
legislatures the remedial steps necessary to bring the school funding system into
constitutional compliance. The courts' most common course has been to declare the system
unconstitutional and send it back to the legislature to make it constitutional."). Of course, as
we will discuss, in some states immediate resistance from the political branches has forced
courts to play a more aggressive remedial role very early on. See, e.g., Richard E. Levy,
Gunfight at the K-12 Corral: Legislative vs. Judicial Power in the Kansas School Finance
Litigation, 54 KAN. L. REV. 1021, 1046-47 (2006) (describing how the legislature's failure to
fully comply provoked the Kansas Supreme Court to order a minimum increase in funding
by a specific date); see also Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417, 439-45 (N.J. 1997).
53. Contrary to the dominant trend, plaintiffs prevailed in New Hampshire and
Washington. However, even these two successes were somewhat qualified. In Federal Way
School District No. 210 v.State, the trial court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment on an extremely narrow claim under Washington's education clause. No. 06-236840-1, slip op. at 8 (Wash. Sup. Ct. Nov. 2, 2007), rev'd, 219 P.3d 941 (Wash. 2009).
Despite striking down a salary system not based on the cost of providing educational
opportunity, the trial court goes to great pains to soften the impact of its ruling. The opening
paragraph notes,
"[T]his decision should in no way be construed to find or even suggest that the legislature has
not provided for full funding of education in the Federal Way School District. The court,
recognizing that the state supreme court would review the case acknowledged that even if the
case were upheld, it would "be of little moment The State legislature has been moving closer
to equalization over the years and getting there will not require great effort."
Id. In Londonderry School District v. State, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that
the state had failed to define a constitutionally adequate education, as it had been ordered to
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separation of powers concerns at their common core. In order to find for
plaintiffs in adequacy cases, judges perceived that they must intervene
substantively in their state's education policy to craft a remedy that would
encroach on traditional legislative prerogatives. This is the broad umbrella
under which fall many more concrete, situational concerns. This Part takes up
the recent set of adequacy decisions and identifies three interrelated factors
within the umbrella of separation of powers that have contributed to the
startling shift in the judicial response to adequacy lawsuits.
First, while separation of powers concerns have always factored in
education litigation, courts in earlier years could mandate reform without
actively intervening in legislative decision-making. Initially, plaintiffs were
fighting for legislative reform at the most basic levels. Legislatures had not yet
been judicially required to meet certain standards in education funding. Now,
plaintiffs need to show that systems subjected to initial reforms are still
underfunded or wholly inadequate or both. When the claim is closer to
legislative deficiency than legislative abdication, plaintiffs struggle to convince
courts that there is a judicial role available that would not involve stepping into
legislative shoes. This remedial concern can also be characterized as a problem
in the plaintiffs ability to prove a breach of the constitutional duty to provide
an adequate education. That judges began to balk-either at the question of
breach or in envisioning an appropriate remedial role-where they once
embraced education suits with a degree of fervor, is in some ways a function of
the adequacy movement's past success in convincing judges to order legislative
reforms.
Second, the increasing centrality of budgetary appropriations and pervasive
use of costing-out studies in adequacy cases have triggered perhaps the most
fundamental separation of powers alarm for courts. Costing-out studies invite
judges to review the spending levels set by the legislature, which is something
they are extremely reluctant to do. This concern is compounded in the
adequacy context by the growing chorus of voices contending that the solution
do a decade earlier. 907 A.2d 988, 996 (N.H. 2006). Noting that "deference ... has its
limits," the court-for the first time-backed its decision with a deadline and warned that if
the state failed to spell out enforceable and reviewable standards by the end of the fiscal year
2007, a trial court or special master might have to do it for them. In this way, the court added
substantial bite to its earlier decision. Indeed, this was a victory for plaintiffs, who had been
awaiting such a step since the court first articulated the state's duty back in 1993. See
McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993). However, it is also important to note that the court
chose not to do so in ClaremontSchool District v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997). In
that case, the court had ordered the state not only to define an adequate education, but also to
1) determine the cost, 2) fund it with constitutional taxes, and 3) "ensure its delivery through
accountability." Londonberry, 907 A.2d at 990. The Londonderry trial court found for
plaintiffs on all three counts, but the state supreme court affirmed only the first and stayed all
other findings. Id. at 996. In addition to considering only one claim, the court gave the state
an entire year to take just that first step. Id. at 995. The dissent criticized the majority for
dancing around the core issue of adequate funding Id. at 998 (Duggan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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lies not in more money, but in such measures as increased accountability, better
management, and the flexibility to fire failing teachers.
Finally, when courts look to other states that have mandated specific
appropriations or reforms, it is not clear to them that such intervention
represents a long-term solution. They fear specific reforms will require
repeated trips back to their courthouses for enforcement, if they can be
enforced at all. The experience of sister states reinforces the conviction that
courts' power to enforce such remedies is tenuous in the face of legislative
resistance.
A. Concerns About Judicial Competence
By 2005, nearly a generation had passed since the first state courts
recognized the constitutional right to education. In the intervening years, as
legislative appropriations failed to keep pace and temporary gains in
educational justice were lost, parents and activists once again looked to the
courts to protect the constitutional rights of their children in the face of political
inaction. Such constitutional challenges to school systems in states that had
already recognized both a qualitative right to education and the judiciary's duty
to uphold it make up the second generation of adequacy litigation.54
Paradoxically, the very successes of early adequacy plaintiffs in reforming
grossly dysfunctional, unequal, and inadequate school systems poses problems
for second generation litigation. A close reading of recent opinions reveals
three primary ways in which the changing education landscape has heightened
separation of powers concerns for courts adjudicating second-generation cases.
First, courts are troubled by the increasingly intrusive remedial role seemingly
demanded in order to improve school systems that have already undergone
significant reforms. This failure to perceive an acceptable remedial role can
lead courts to abdicate their function entirely in adequacy adjudication,
essentially, if not overtly, reversing any positive precedent. Second, signs of
renewed political engagement and progress (however minimal) may cause
courts to question the very legitimacy of judicial intervention. Over the years, a
powerful strain of argument has developed maintaining that the judiciary
should only engage in structural reform litigation in the face of egregious
political neglect.55 In courts that subscribe to this view, plaintiffs will struggle
to convince judges that anything more than perfunctory oversight on their part
is constitutionally permitted, let alone necessary, when the legislature is also
actively involved. Finally, improved schools further blur the already uncertain
54. See, e.g., Michael A. Rebell, Adequacy Cases Are Alive and Well (Oct. 29, 2007)
http://www.schoolfunding.info/blog/2007/10/29/adequacy-cases-are-alive-and-well/.
55. See, e.g., William A. Fletcher The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional
Remedies and JudicialLegitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 694 (1982) ("The only legitimate basis
for a . . . judge to take over the political function in devising or choosing a remedy in an
institutional suit is the demonstrated unwillingness or incapacity of the political body").
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line delineating breach. Where ambiguous constitutional standards and steadily
improving conditions pose tricky line-drawing problems, courts are much more
likely to defer to the judgment of the legislature. The latest adequacy litigation
in Massachusetts presents a striking example of the first two trends.
1. New Remedial Challenges
In 1993, Massachusetts became one of the earliest states to hold that its
children were constitutionally entitled to an adequate education. In McDuffy v.
Secretary of the Executive Office of Education, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court unanimously and unequivocally held that children in the Commonwealth
are constitutionally entitled to an education that will provide them with the
seven capabilities set forth by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Rose, and
prepare them to take their place as knowledgeable and productive citizens. 56
Twelve years later, however, a second-generation adequacy case produced
a divided court newly skeptical of its own ability to remedy problems of
inadequacy in education. 57 In Hancock v. Driscoll, students from four of the
state's poorest public school districts revived the McDuffy case, alleging that
their schools "continue[d] to suffer with largely the same conditions" that
existed prior to McDuffy, thereby depriving them of the education mandated by
the Supreme Court.58 The Hancock plaintiffs acknowledged that the 1993
education reforms had "achieved a great deal,"59 but they argued that the state
continued to leave some of its neediest children behind. 6o
Despite reaffirming McDuffy as binding precedent and finding that the
Commonwealth had failed to achieve the objectives outlined therein, 6 1 the
56. 615 N.E.2d 516, 548, 554 (Mass. 1993). Justice O'Connor disagreed only on the

question of breach. Id. at 556 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
57. Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134 (Mass. 2005) (Seven justices wrote
four separate opinions: The chiefjustice wrote for the plurality, joined by Justices Spina and
Cordy; Justice Cowin concurred and was joined by Justice Sosman; Justice Greaney wrote a
dissent in which Justice Ireland joined and Justice Ireland wrote a dissent in which Justice
Greaney joined.).
58. Id. at 1145.

59. Id. at 1151.
60. Id. at 1138.
61. Five of the seven justices reaffirmed McDuffy: Chief Justice Marshall and Justices

Spina, Cordy, Greaney, and Ireland. Id. at 1137 (Marshall, C.J., concurring) (plurality
opinion); id at 1165 (Greaney, J., dissenting). In their joint dissent, Justices Greaney and
Ireland make clear their position that the state has clearly failed to achieve the McDuffy
objectives. Id. at 1166 (Greaney, J., dissenting). Although the plurality claimed to find no
breach, the chief justice, writing for the plurality, conceded that the "goals of education
reform adopted since McDujfy have [clearly not] been fully achieved."Id. at 1140 (Marshall,

C.J., concurring) (plurality opinion). In fact, she writes, "No one, including the defendants,
disputes that serious inadequacies in public education remain." Id. at 1139. She
acknowledged that the state's record of education reform since 1993 is "marred by areas of
real and in some instances profound failure." Id. at 1152. She further admitted that the "slow,
sometimes painfully slow, pace of educational reform in the focus districts," has maintained

HeinOnline -- 6 Stan. J. C.R. & C.L. 98 2010

Apr. 2010]

ADEQUACYLITIGATION

99

Hancock plurality held for the defendants. In her plurality opinion, Chief
Justice Marshall denied plaintiffs relief not because she did not find a
constitutional violation, but because she could not identify an acceptable
remedy. In an opinion reflecting a full range of traditional justiciability
concerns, the chief justice makes clear her discomfort with remedies she deems
to be properly the province of concomitant branches of government.
At trial, the superior court judge had suggested two possible remedial
paths: 1) to order the Department of Education "to determine the 'actual cost'
of funding a 'constitutionally adequate level of education' for all students in the
focus districts," and 2) to order "the Commonwealth . .. to implement the
funding and administrative changes necessary to achieve that result." 62 The
chief justice rejects both of these recommendations. She explicitly refuses to
order a costing-out study "rife with policy choices that are properly the
Legislature's domain." 63 Further, she argues that the judiciary has neither the
authority nor the competence to make such fundamentally political choices.64
And finally, because the costing-out study alone falls far short of a cure for
failing schools, she warns of a slippery slope toward "forcing the Legislature to
appropriate more money." 65
The chief justice's remedial concerns underscore one major difficulty faced
by courts in second-generation adequacy cases. Whereas the court in McDuffy
had deferred to the legislature to determine how to fulfill its constitutional
duty-finding these "details of implementation . .. best left, at least initially, to
the executive and to the legislative branches of government"66-persisting
inadequacies would have required that the Hancock court offer more specific
guidance on the substance of the right. If a court perceives the state to be
making a good faith effort to improve education, then issuing yet another
declaratory judgment that the school system is unconstitutional becomes an

"sharp disparities in the educational opportunities, and the performance, of some
Massachusetts school students." Id. at 1138, 1154. She agreed with the superior court
judge's assessment that the failures are due-in part-to insufficient funding: "No one
reading the judge's report can be left with any doubt that the question is not 'if more money
is needed, but how much." Id. at 1157.
62. Id. at 1138.
63. Id. at 1156.
64. Id. at 1156-57. ("The study would assume, for example, that in order to fulfill its
constitutional obligation under the education clause, the Commonwealth 'must' provide free
preschool for all three and four year old children 'at risk' in the focus districts, and
presumably throughout the Commonwealth thereafter. That is a policy decision for the
Legislature. . . . Other programs might be equally effective to address the needs of at risk
students, such as remedial programs . . .

programs to involve parents more
judgment; each carries a cost,
fundamentally political. Courts are
65. Id. at 1157.
66. McDuffy v. Sec'y of the
1993) (emphasis added).

,

nutrition and drug counselling programs or

directly in school affairs. Each choice embodies a value
in real, immediate tax dollars; and each choice is
not well positioned to make such decisions.").
Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 550 (Mass.
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empty formalism. The legislature need only respond by continuing to make its
best effort to improve the system.
Faced with the prospect of finding a constitutional violation with no
meaningful remedy, the Hancock plurality ultimately held that the plaintiffs
had failed to prove that the Commonwealth had violated the state's education
clause. 67 Although concurring in this result, Justice Cowin's opinion in
Hancock criticizes the chief justice's plurality opinion as less-than-honest. He
accuses her of "avoid[ing] the need to deal with McDuff 's intrusive and flawed
analysis" by an "artful" rendition of "clear error" review. In other words,
Justice Cowin suggests that the plurality holding fails to find a clear breach of
the constitutional duty when, in fact, the problem lies in the court's own
institutional competence to order a remedy:
If the [c]hief [j]ustice and those [j]ustices who joined with her are
concerned about a self-imposed position at the helm of this debate, they
should reject much or all of McDuffy. If, on the other hand, they are
comfortable with the prospect of determining whether the Commonwealth's
educational reforms and expenditures have produced satisfactory
results,
should accord the trial judge's findings and conclusions their due deference.they
Justice Cowin here hints at the deeper tension running through Chief
Justice Marshall's opinion. Although the chief justice never explicitly mentions
"separation of powers" or "justiciability" in her opinion, those principles drive
her decision. For example, she explains that because in Massachusetts,
[t]he education clause leaves the details of education policymaking to the
Governor and the Legislature. Where the Governor and the Legislature ...
exercise ultimate control over, and provide substantial and increasing (subject
only to dire fiscal circumstances) resources to support, public education in a
way that minimizes rather than accentuates differences between communities
based on property valuations, constitutionally impermissible classifications,
and other criteria extrinsic to the educational mission, we cannot conclude that
they are presently violating the education clause. 70
Forced to choose between a more aggressive remedial stance and
abdication of any role in adjudicating the education right, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts bows out by failing to find breach.
2. Legitimacy of Judicial Intervention
Even had the most traditional of judicial remedies been available to the
Hancock court, it is not clear that the court would have been persuaded of its
prerogative to intervene on behalf of Massachusetts' children. The court's tone

67. Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at 1155.

68. Id. at 1162 (Mass. 2005) (Cowin, J., concurring).
69. Id.

70. Id. at 1152-53 (Marshall, C.J., concurring) (plurality opinion) (internal citations
omitted).
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of deference may reflect an additional concern shared by judicial counterparts
across the country: that courts lack the authority to intervene in education in the
absence of a breakdown of the political process. 7 1 Indeed, some scholars have
argued that grievous deficiencies alone are not sufficient to trigger judicial
action. Instead, the judiciary can only legitimately engage in structural reform
when a government institution becomes "substantially immune from
72
conventional political mechanisms of correction."
In Hancock, the chief justice's opinion points to the standard of legislative
73
She
breakdown as the bar that must be met for judicial intervention.
on
the
not
by
focusing
its
duty
determines whether the Commonwealth has met
quality of the education, but rather on whether the Legislature's action merits
judicial intervention. Instead of asking if the state is preparing the rich and poor
in every city and town to "participate as free citizens," she questions whether
74
Has it
the Legislature "neglected or avoided a constitutional command."
acted "in an arbitrary, nonresponsive, or irrational way to meet the
constitutional mandate"? 75 Is it "presently neglecting or is [it] likely to neglect
its constitutional duties, thus requiring judicial intervention?" 76 Thus, after
framing breach as a question of legislative engagement, she is able to find the
education inadequate but the Legislature's efforts sincere. She concludes the
court cannot offer relief:
71. See, e.g., Carroll-Hall v. Rell, 44 Conn. L. Rptr. 224, No. X09CV054019406, 2007
WL 2938295, at *13 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 17, 2007) (identifying complete abdicationsuch as total abolition of English as a Second Language programs-as the bar for legitimate
judicial intervention); Young v. Williams, Nos. 03-CI-00055 & 03-CI-01 152, slip op. at 15
(Ky. Cir. Ct. Feb. 13, 2007) (citing improving test scores and performance relative to
neighboring states and concluding, "Given this progress, we are unwilling at this time to
declare that the level of education funding in Kentucky is unconstitutionally inadequate.");
Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 789 (Tex. 2005)
(concluding that the constitutional standards could not "be used to fault a public education
system that is working to meet [those] . . . goals merely because it has not yet succeeded in
doing so").
72. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1016, 1062 (2004); see also Marisol A. v. Giuliani,
185 F.R.D. 152, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting that even if the plaintiffs established liability at
trial, "the Court may not have been in a position to provide for more relief than simply
encouraging continued effort and improvement by [the defendant]"). But see Owen M. Fiss,
Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1, 53 (1979) (arguing for the role of the
judge in effectuating structural legal reform).
73. See Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at 1138 n.2 (Marshall, C.J., concurring) (plurality
opinion) (distinguishing judicial intervention in McDuffy as necessitated by the
Commonwealth's utter neglect: "[B]efore the enactment of the Education Reform Act of
1993 [], many of the Commonwealth's children, notably poor children, urban children,
children of color, and children with special needs were in essence systematically discarded
educationally, with no obligation recognized by the Commonwealth to intervene on their
behalf.") (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 1137, 1146.
75. Id. at 1140.
76. Id. at 1155.

HeinOnline -- 6 Stan. J. C.R. & C.L. 101 2010

102

STANFORD JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES

[VI: 1

No one ... disputes that serious inadequacies in public education remain.
But the Commonwealth is moving systemically to address those deficiencies
and continues to make education reform a fiscal priority. It is significant . . .
that the Commonwealth has allocated billions of dollars for education reform
since the act's passage .... By creating and implementing standardized
Statewide criteria of funding and oversight; by establishing objective
competency goals and the means to measure progress toward those goals; by
developing, and acting on, a plan to eliminate impediments to education based
on property valuation, disability, lack of English proficiency, and racial or
ethnic status; and by directing significant new resources to schools with the
most dire needs, I cannot conclude that the Commonwealth currently is not
meeting its constitutional charge to "cherish the interests of... public
schools. "

Justice Greaney, the sole justice on the Hancock Court to have participated
in McDuffy twelve years earlier, interprets the chief justice's opinion as
effectively overruling McDuffy.78 Seizing on her use of the words "priority,"
"commitment," "plan," and "progress," he criticizes her for interpreting the
duty to educate as a duty that turns on "effort and not on results"-an emphasis
he views as incompatible with McDuffy 's holding.79 In other words, children in
the Commonwealth have only a right to an earnest legislature-one that is
trying its best to provide an adequate education.
Whether the chief justice's opinion is read to guarantee a right to an
adequate education (but, no remedy) or no such right at all (as the dissent
would argue), the outcome here is the same: plaintiffs are denied relief as long
as the legislature is deemed to be making a good faith effort to reform the
school system.
As was the case in Massachusetts, many courts adjudicating secondgeneration cases will find grievous failures in education despite no longer being
confronted with inactive or inattentive legislatures. The resulting separation of
powers concerns threaten to drown out plaintiffs' assertions that political
activity is not the same as ensuring that a state achieves its constitutional duty
toward children.
3. Uncertain Breach
The final way in which political progress heightens separation of powers
concerns in education adequacy suits is also the most obvious: as school
conditions and the constitutional standard converge, courts are less certain
whether there is a constitutional violation to be remedied in the first place.
Despite the sophistication of costing-out studies, adequacy still leaves
courts without a consensus about the precise measurement of "adequate"

Id. at 1139 (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 1165, 1173 (Greaney, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 1171.
77.
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funding or "adequate" education. As Professor Peter Enrich writes, "Faced with
a constitutional provision mandating an indeterminate level of governmental
activity, and demanding a commensurate and equally indeterminate (but very
large) dedication of governmental resources, a court's most natural inclination
is to defer to the choices made by the political branches . . ..
The question is naturally less daunting for courts when the level of funding
or quality of education falls below any imaginably acceptable standard. Thus,
many early adequacy courts could intervene with moral certainty while at the
same time not being forced to set a specific level of funding or quality.
Whatever the constitutional standard, they could declare with confidence that
8
the current education system fell short. '
As budgets have increased and schools improved, courts have faced more
difficult factual scenarios in which levels of funding fell near, or within, the
spectrum of plausible standards. 82 In such situations, courts have seemed
significantly less comfortable substituting their own judgment for that of the
legislature on issues that push against the bounds of the separation of powers.
B. Increased Focus on Funding Levels
Adequacy suits have always been about money, 84 but recent cases suggest
that appropriations pressures have now become one of the greatest stumbling
blocks for courts as they consider their ability to respond to the claims of
adequacy plaintiffs. 85 There are three interrelated reasons why money has
80. Enrich, supra note 36, at 172.
81. See, e.g., Young v. Williams, Nos. 03-CI-00055 & 03-CI-01 152, slip op. at 13 (Ky.
Cir. Ct. Feb. 13, 2007) ("[Rose] was decided based upon evidence alleging that the Kentucky
school system provided students a vastly inferior education, falling far short of 'efficient."');
Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at 1151 ("In McDuffy, this court faced an overwhelming, stipulated
body of evidence that the structure of public education in Massachusetts was condemning
generations of public school students in our poorer communities to an inferior education. It
was a record of abysmal failure." (emphasis added)); Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol.
Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 783 (Tex. 2005) ("In Edgewood I and II, we did not find
it necessary to articulate a standard of review; the public school finance system was simply
not 'efficient' by any stretch of the word.").
82. See, e.g., Moore v. State, No. 3AN-04-9756, slip op. at 19-20 (Alaska Super. Ct.
June 21, 2007) (discussing prior reforms to the school funding formula that directed more
resources to the poorest districts).
83. See Enrich, supra note 36, at 178-79 (finding school funding constitutionally
adequate).
84. See Christopher E. Adams, Is Economic Integration the Fourth Wave in School
Finance Litigation? 56 EMORY L.J. 1613, 1614-15. Edgewood I challenged the structural
design of the school finance system that starved property-poor districts for funds. Edgewood
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 392-93 (Tex. 1989). In Rose, liability may have
turned on the state's failure to provide an adequate education, but the Court made it
extremely clear that the state's duty included the requisite funding for a constitutional
education. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 216 (Ky. 1989).
85. E.g., Crane Elementary Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 04-0076, slip op. at (Ariz. Ct. App.
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increasingly become a barrier to success in adequacy cases. First, plaintiffs
have focused more and more on levels of funding as the measure of adequacy
in education, often to the exclusion of other elements that might be less tangible
but more easily approached by courts. Second, costing-out studies have
exacerbated this problem by focusing courts on specific dollar amounts.
Persuading courts to demand a specific budget from the legislature sets a higher
separation of powers bar than asking for an indeterminate amount of increased
funding in order to accomplish other specific objectives such as improved
facilities. Judges have refused repeatedly in recent years to interfere with
legislative judgments about exactly how much money is enough. Finally, the
increased focus on money has engendered a countermovement arguing that
money alone does not make a successful school. This means that just at the
time courts are being pointed toward money as a solution in adequacy cases,
they are hearing loud arguments against the efficacy of such a remedy.
1. Focused on Funding
Separation of powers concerns have intensified in the past several years
partially as a result of adequacy's focus on money as discussed in Part I.
Because of their roots in equity, early adequacy claims focused on the
structural aspects of school finance systems that systematically condemned
students in poor school districts to an inadequate education.87 For example, the
Edgewood I plaintiffs claimed that a school finance system heavily reliant on
local property taxes violated not only equal protection but also the state right to
education. As the litigation strategy evolved, however, plaintiffs began to
challenge not the basic funding structure but funding levels themselves. 89
When an adequacy claim is structured around the level of funding, however,
courts are forced to evaluate appropriations, the heart of the legislature's
domain, rather than to consider the overall structure of school finance, an area
in which a court could potentially intervene without overtly mandating
increased expenditures.
Further cornering courts in the legislative domain, adequacy plaintiffs
Nov. 22, 2006); Young, Nos. 03-CI-00055 & 03-CI-01 152, slip op. at 7; Hancock v. Comm'r
of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1157 (Mass. 2005); Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State (CFE
111), 861 N.E.2d 50, 59 (N.Y. 2006); Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 93-CP-310169, slip op. at 158 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 29, 2005); Neeley, 176 S.W.3d 746, 751 (Tex.
2005).
86. See, e.g., ERIC A. HANUSHEK, MAKING SCHOOLS WORK: IMPROVING PERFORMANCE
AND CONTROLLING COSTS (1994); ERIC A. HANUSHEK, THE ALCHEMY OF "COSTING OUT" AN

ADEQUATE

EDUCATION

35

(2006)

[hereinafter

COSTING

OUT],

http://www.uark.edu/ua/der/EWPA/Research/SchoolFinance/1787.html.
S.W.3d at 769.
87. See Enrich, supra note 36, at 109.
88. Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 391-92.
89. See, e.g., Neeley, 176 S.W.3d at 753.
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increasingly emphasize funding levels to the exclusion of broader challenges to
the overall adequacy of the public school education. 90 Kentucky is illustrative
of this trend. In 2007 a Kentucky trial court dismissed adequacy claims
expressly due to the nature of the plaintiffs' claim. In Young v. Williams, the
plaintiffs had focused their pleadings specifically on the level of school
funding, claiming it was both "inadequate and arbitrarily determined by the
legislature." 9 1 On a motion for summary judgment, however, Judge Thomas
Wingate of the Franklin County Circuit Court denied the Young plaintiffs a
chance to proceed to trial with their claim. 92
Significantly, in granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment,
the Young court did not disavow Rose, Kentucky's landmark education case.
Instead, the opinion sought to reiterate Rose's holding that only the judiciary
can determine when a constitutional standard is met. 93 At the same time,
however, Judge Wingate found that Young was a different case from Rose. In
Young, he wrote, plaintiffs "allege[] inadequate monetary expenditures, not an
[inadequate] education system." 94 Thus, Judge Wingate reasoned, they "ask[]
the Court to exceed the rule from Rose by going beyond mere constitutional
interpretation. .. [to] stipulate[e] the manner by which the General Assembly
must carry out its responsibilities." 95 Reinforcing this point, Judge Wingate's
opinion explicitly states that the plaintiffs could have survived summary
judgment if only they had brought "appropriate claims" before the court,
backed by a "fact pattern parallel to Rose." 96 It argued that courts are-and
should be-"less willing to stretch [the] separation of powers" for disputes over
funding than for claims alleging a violation of the underlying right. 97
"Ultimately,"

Judge Wingate wrote, "increase[d] . . . funding must be the

productofpolitical will, not judicialdecree." 98
90. See, e.g., Moore v. State, No. 3AN-04-9756, slip op. at 173 (Alaska Super. Ct. June
21, 2007) "The gravamen of this case.. .has been about funding. Very limited testimony was
presented about Kuspuk's curriculum, its alignment with the State's standards, the
professional development available to its staff, the communities' involvement in their
schools, and the other components of its educational system." Id. at 7. However, the court
noted that "[t]he primary question in this case-whether the public education system in
Alaska is constitutionally adequate-can not be framed solely in terms of funding, but must
also address the opportunity for children to obtain an education. Funding is just one
component of the State's public school system." Id. at 173. (emphasis added); Neb. Coal. for
Educ. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164, 169 (Neb. 2007) (noting that
plaintiffs failed to allege at any point the negative impact of funding insufficiencies on the
education received by students in the classroom).
91. Young v. Williams, Nos. 03-Cl-00055 & 03-CI-01 152, slip op. at I (Ky. Cir. Ct.
Feb. 13, 2007).

92. Id. at 20.
93. Id. at 16.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 13.
Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
Id. at 13.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
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Courts have also suggested that narrow claims of inadequate funding
narrow the remedial options available to the court. For example, the plaintiffs
in the most recent Texas adequacy case, Neeley v. West Orange Cove Consol
Independent School District, like those in Young, alleged only inadequate
funding. 99 The Texas Supreme Court denied them relief.o0 0 In response to the
dissent's argument for a nonmonetary remedy, the Neeley majority responded:
"[w]e are constrained by the arguments raised by the parties to address only
issues of school finance." 0 As these recent decisions in Texas and Kentucky
show, the evolution of plaintiffs' litigation strategies over the past decade has
had the effect of pushing state courts ever closer to appropriations, an area
where they are extremely loath to tread.
2. The Costs of Costing-Out
The salience of funding levels in education adequacy cases has also
increased significantly with the advent of the "costing-out" study. Even in cases
closely replicating previously successful pleadings or with broader claims
about the adequacy of education, costing-out studies have recently become a
ubiquitous tool for plaintiffs wishing to give courts a concrete estimate of what
it would take to achieve adequacy in their states.
First developed in 1997, a "costing-out" study employs one of four
methodologies to calculate the cost of providing a constitutionally adequate
education to all children.102 By quantifying "adequacy," these studies offer a
tangible benchmark for a somewhat nebulous constitutional standard. For
example, in Young, all of the five costing-out studies concluded that
appropriations for the 2001-2002 school year fell short by at least $740
million. 0 3 Similarly, the costing-out study offered by the Neeley plaintiffs
concluded that the state must boost expenditures by a minimum of $1.65
billion.104 Thus, costing-out studies have quickly become central to the core
adequacy litigation strategy.' 05
99. Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 751 (Tex.
2005).

100. Id. at 799.
101. Id. at 754 (quoting Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d 489, 524 (Tex. 1992)).
102. For a more comprehensive introduction to costing-out studies (theory,
methodologies, and utilization), see, for example, Adams, supra note 84, at 1623-27 (2007);
Janet D. McDonald, Mary F. Hughes, & Gary W. Ritter, School Finance Litigation and
Adequacy Studies, 27 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 69, 89-104 (2004); and HANUSHEK,
COSTING OUT, supra note 86.
103. Young, Nos. 03-CI-00055 & 03-CI-01 152 at 14, 12.
104. See Neeley, 176 S.W.3d at 769.
105. See McDonald, supra note 102, at 93 tbl.2. (describing how the first costing out
study was conducted in Ohio by consultants Augenblick & Myers in 1997 and how over the
next decade consultants were hired to conduct costing out studies in at least seventeen other
states). Indeed, at least one costing-out study was at issue in more than half of the nineteen

cases examined in this article. Plaintiffs offered costing-out studies not only in Young and
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The same power of the costing-out study to quantify a state's failures in
education also necessarily accentuates separation of powers concerns. It shifts
the focus of an adequacy case from defining the contours of the constitutional
right to arbitrating the underlying funding dispute.'o6 The former is
quintessentially judicial. The latter is a power explicitly granted to the political
branches by most state constitutions. 0 7 For this reason, under traditional
separation of powers precepts, the judiciary is extremely reluctant to reviewlet alone mandate-appropriations. os
In 2006, the New York court of appeals demonstrated why using the
costing-out study may create more problems than it solves in Campaignfor
Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE Il). 109 Despite being initially sympathetic to
adequacy plaintiffs claims, the court was extremely reluctant to interfere with
the details of its legislature's budgetary determinations."o In 2003, the court of
appeals had found for the plaintiffs in their adequacy lawsuit, CFE I, and
directed the state to reform the current school funding and accountability
systems to ensure that "every school in New York City would have the
resources necessary for providing the opportunity for a sound basic
education."' This remedy, while not as explicit as some, seemed to demand a
Neeley, but also in Moore v. State, No. 3AN-04-9756, slip op. at 173 (Alaska Super. Ct. June
21, 2007); Carroll-Hall v. Rell, No. X09CV054019406, 2007 WL 2938295, at*l (Conn.
Super. Ct. Sept. 17, 2007); Montoy v. State, 138 P.3d 755, 764 (Kan. 2006); Campaign for
Fiscal Equity v. State (CFE 11), 801 N.E.2d 326 (N.Y. 2003); and Oklahoma Education
Association v. State, 158 P.3d 1058, 1062 (Okla. 2007). The plaintiffs requested that the
Court order the state to conduct a costing-out study in Hancock v. Commissioner of
Education, 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1156 (Mass. 2005), and in Crane Elementary School District v.
State, No. I CA-CV 04-0076 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2006).
106. The underlying funding dispute was underscored by competing costing out studies
offered by the opposing parties. The study offered by plaintiffs concluded that Texas needed
to increase school funding by $1.653 billion to $6.171 billion in order to achieve 55%
statewide pass rate on the state standardized test. In contrast, the study offered by defendants
concluded just $563 million to $731 million in additional funds was necessary to achieve the
same goal. Neeley, 176 S.W.3d at 769-70. Similarly, whereas the studies in Young uniformly
concluded that "fulfilling Kentucky's constitutional mandate toward education would require
significant[ly] more money than current funding levels," they "disagreed as to the precise
amount necessary." Young, Nos. 03-CI-00055 & 03-CI-01 152, slip op. at 2. For the 20012002 school year, the various studies estimated Kentucky schools to be underfunded by as
little as $740 million or as much as $2.3 billion. Id. at 2-3.
107. See, e.g., CONN. CONST., art. 4, § 16 ("The governor shall have power to
disapprove of any item or items of any bill making appropriations of money . . . .").
108. See, e.g., Carroll-Hall, 2007 WL 2938295, at *12 (citing Rodriguez for the
proposition that the judiciary should defer to the legislature on school finance issues as the
court "lack[s] both the expertise and the familiarity with local problems so necessary to the
making of wise decisions with respect to the raising and disposition of public revenues.");
Okla. Educ. Ass'n, 158 P.3d at 1066 ("This Court has no authority to consider the
desirability, wisdom, or practicabilityoffiscal legislation." (quoting Calvey v. Dixon, 997
P.2d 164, 171-72 (Okla. 2000)) (emphasis added)).
109. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State (CFE Ill), 861 N.E.2d 50 (N.Y. 2006).
110. Id. at 59.
111. Id. at 53.
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comprehensive overhaul of the state's funding scheme. In response, however,
the Governor chose to adopt the lowest number generated by various possible
methods of estimating the state's spending gap on education and proposed a
program bill incorporating that methodology.112
In CFE III, plaintiffs returned to court to challenge the governor's sum as
insufficient to bring the state into compliance with the mandate of CFE H1. At
the end of an extensive fact-finding process, the lower court adopted the
findings of an appointed panel of expert referees, concluding that New York
was spending $5.63 billion less than was constitutionally necessary to provide a
sound basic education." 3
In a huge blow to New York's adequacy campaigners, however, the court
of appeals rubber-stamped the Governor's proposal, holding that the court's job
was merely to determine the rationality of the State's proposed spending.114
Tellingly, the court of appeals opinion does little to define how a "rationality"
test would work. Instead, much like rational basis review in equal protection
doctrine, the court suggests that if there is any way that the Legislature's
determination can be justified, then it will be viewed as rational. Just how
deferential the court's opinion is becomes clear from a close reading. The
majority opinion expends as much ink on its separation of powers concerns,
and in articulating something akin to the restraint prescribed by the political
question doctrine, as it does actually reviewing the State's funding
determination for reasonableness." 5
In making its determination, the court of appeals stressed that deference is
"especially necessary where it is the State's budget plan that is being
questioned." Thus, the court imposed a self-described "formidable burden" of
proof on plaintiffs, emphasizing that a state's financing scheme must be
"patently irrational... before judicial deference will give way."ll6 Just three
years after mandating reform, the court proved unwilling to interfere
substantively with the spending determinations made by other branches of
government.
Recent opinions from around the country echo the concerns of the CFE III
court. In Massachusetts, Justice Marshall cited the costing-out study as
threatening to send her court down the slippery slope toward "forcing the
112. The number the Governor chose was $1.93 billion. Id. at 52.
113. Id. at 57.
114. Id. at 57 ("The role of the courts is not, as Supreme Court assumed, to determine
the best way to calculate the cost of a sound basic education in New York City schools, but
to determine whether the State's proposed calculation of that cost is rational. Supreme Court
should not have endorsed an examination in which the cost of a sound basic education in
New York was calculated anew, when the state budget plan had already reasonably
calculated that cost. In this respect, we agree with the Appellate Division.").
115. Id at 58 ("[T]the manner by which the State addresses complex societal and
governmental issues is a subject left to the discretion of the political branches of
government.").
116. Id. at 58.
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Legislature to appropriate more money,""17 a step her concurring colleagues
denounce as a patent violation of the separation of powers:
Often, these disagreements about education concern how much money to
spend and how best to spend it. The issue of public education is thus no
different from our political controversies concerning whether we should invest
more money in our public transportation system . . . and the amount we should
provide in public assistance to low-income individuals and families. In other
words, the controversy before us today is largely a funding debate. Choices
regarding how much money to spend and how to spend it are in every instance
political decisions left to the Legislature, to be arrived at with input from the
executive branch and the citizenry; they should not be the result of judicial
directives. 118
In Kentucky, the Young court refused to "substitute the [costing-out
study's] approximations ... for the General Assembly's actual appropriations,"
characterizing plaintiffs' requests for the court to "determine the adequacy of
the specific amount of education funding," as "ask[ing] the court to push the
limits of separation of powers."ll 9 In Texas, the Supreme Court largely ignored
the costing-out studies to which the district court had accorded great weight in
striking down current funding levels, emphasizing that legislatively determined
school funding levels should be deemed constitutional unless "arbitrary." 20
The costing-out study is undoubtedly a useful tool for making tangible the
harm in an adequacy case and/or quantifying a proposed remedy, but it is
increasingly a tool plaintiffs use at their own peril. When combined with active
legislatures, improved schools and ever-louder voices arguing that money (or
money alone) will not solve education problems, the predominance of the
costing-out study only confirms courts' fears that they are being pushed firmly
into the legislative territory of appropriations. Whereas earlier courts facing
statewide education crises might not have quibbled about stepping into the
legislative zone to stir up an inactive body or even suggesting particular
appropriations, recent courts are no longer working in such a legislative
vacuum. For these courts, the costing-out study can trigger alarms by seeming
to frame adequacy cases as suits about funding and nothing more. Perhaps
117. Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1157 (Mass. 2005).

118. Id. at 1164-65. Even the Hancock dissent-which would have ordered a costingout study-acknowledged the inherent separation of powers concerns involved in mandating
appropriations:
I am well aware of the limitations that apply to unelected members of a court ordering an
elected Legislature and executive to appropriate money and, frankly, the difficulties that
might be encountered if it became necessary to enforce any orders against recalcitrant elected
officials. The problem, of course, is magnified considerably when dealing with expenditures
needed to fund public education; the need to allocate resources equitably between various
school districts achieving at different levels; the complexity of education policy in general;
and the disagreement between competent experts on how best to remediate a nonperforming
or poorly performing school district.

Id. at 1172 (Greaney, J. dissenting).
119. Young, Nos. 03-CI-0005 & 03-CI-0 1152, slip op. at 14, 37 (emphasis added).
120. See Neeley, 176 S.W.3d 746, 785 (Tex. 2005).
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worse, they can provide an excuse for wary courts to avoid grappling further
with the remedial challenges of modem adequacy suits.
3. Doubts That Money Alone is the Solution
The judiciary's willingness to encroach traditional separation of powers
boundaries has waned with its increasing faith in the efficacy of money as a
solution. Adequacy's initial success fueled a concerted counter-movement that
has effectively cast doubt on the basic assumption that increased funding alone
will improve academic performance.121 This movement has produced literature
and experts widely cited and called upon by defendants in adequacy cases. No
Child Left Behind reinforces the idea that money doesn't matter by sending a
strong message to the judiciary that the nation's most difficult education
problems should be remedied by stronger accountability measures, not
*
*
122
increased spending.
Setting aside the validity of these claims, one thing is certain: the latest
adequacy decisions reveal that the courts are, in fact, increasingly skeptical that
increased funding will produce constitutionally adequate school systems.
Whereas in 1989 the Texas Supreme Court confidently declared, "[t]he amount
of money spent on a student's education has a real and meaningful impact on
the educational opportunity offered that student,"1 23 its confidence soon
faltered. By 2005, the Court characterized the same relationship as "neither
simple nor direct," warning that while achievement "can and often does
improve with greater resources . . . money does not guarantee better schools or

more educated students." 1 24
Sharing in that sentiment, many courts have recently accorded great weight
to the nonmonetary barriers to academic success: financial mismanagement,
lackluster school leadership, and environmental factors. For example, trial
courts in Arizona and South Carolina argue that increased expenditures will
have little impact where children are exposed to a negative home
environment. 125 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts suggested that

121. See, e.g.,

ERIC A. HANUSHEK et al., MAKING SCHOOLS WORK: IMPROVING

(1994).
122. Cf Danielle Holley-Walker, The Accountability Cycle: The Recovery School
DistrictAct and New Orleans' Charter Schools, 40 CONN L. REv. 125, 130, 141 (describing
how "accountability cycle" started by passage of NCLB, "accountability-based education
reform legislation," and arguing requirement that states "adopt accountability measures"
leads to creation of more charter schools); Ryan, supra note 11, at 933-34 (arguing that
states may lower academic standards, increase segregation in classrooms, and eject lowperforming students due to accountability provisions of NCLB).
123. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1989)
(emphasis added).
124. Neeley, 176 S.W.3d at 788.
125. See Crane Elementary Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 04-0076, slip op. at 24 (Ariz. Ct.
App. Nov. 22, 2006); Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 93-CP-31-0169, slip op. at
PERFORMANCE AND CONTROLLING COSTs
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financial mismanagement and corruption are at the root of the education
problem.126 An Alaska trial court also underscored the importance of
nonmonetary inputs.127
Trial courts in Arizona and South Carolina refused plaintiffs' plea for
increased resources they believed would have little impact amidst a culture of
poverty. Distinguishing plaintiffs' claims of inadequate operations funding
from an earlier adequacy victory on facilities funding, the court in Crane
Elementary School District v. State of Arizona placed the blame for persistent
failure on broken homes, not broken schools:
Here, the underlying circumstances common to at-risk students that are
predictors of poor performance, e.g., low parent participation and low selfesteem, are not caused by the State's educational funding system but are
attributable to a dysfunctional home environment that, unlike deteriorating
capital facilities, cannot easily be remedied by an influx of money.' 28
Such creeping doubts about the efficacy of injecting more money into the
education system only fortify the judiciary's inclination to defer to legislative
judgment, even if that judgment has permitted mismanagement and waste. In
the case of Crane, the court declined to hold the state accountable for problems
it argued it could no more solve than it could create.129
The South Carolina trial judge in Abbeville v. State also doubted that the
school system could simply spend its way to success. In fact, he went so far as
to suggest that the money thrown at failing schools had largely been wasted,
partially because remedial efforts were vitiated by the forces of poverty and
shattered families and partially because the money came too late.1 30 For these
reasons, instead of explicitly mandating more appropriations, the trial judge
ordered South Carolina to provide preschool in the plaintiff districts-a remedy
he hoped would mediate the environmental factors proven to leave
kindergartners from poor families lagging behind their resource-richer peers.13
That the trial judge found any remedy at all, and particularly such a
dramatic one, could be seen as a victory for the Abbeville plaintiffs. The trial
158 (S.C. Ct. Com. PI. Dec. 29, 2005) (finding the "millions of dollars spent each year on the
Plaintiff Districts" have had no "appreciable impact" in student achievement due in part to
mediating factors, such as prenatal factors, family status, divorce, frequent moving, and child
rearing). The Alaska trial court also underscored the importance of nonmonetary inputs.
Moore v. State, No. 3AN-04-9756, slip op. at 174-77 (Alaska Super. Ct. 2007).
126. See Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1157 (Mass. 2005) (noting
that proposed remedies addressed only funding and not the "failing administrative and
financial management that currently deprives students in the focus districts of the
educational opportunities they deserve.").
127. See Moore, No. 3AN-04-9756, slip. op. at 174-77.

128. Crane Elementary Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 04-0076, at 24 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 22,
2006).
129. Id.

130. See Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 93-CP-31-0169, slip op. at 158-59
(S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 29, 2005).
131. Id. at 159-62.
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judge had been so reluctant to interfere with education funding that he initially
dismissed plaintiffs' adequacy claim as a nonjusticiable political question. The
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, explicitly holding that it would
be error to use "judicial restraint, separation of powers, and the political
question doctrine as the basis for declining to decide the meaning of the
education clause."l 32 Nonetheless, when the trial judge eventually issued his
ruling mandating preschool, the Abbeville plaintiffs did not see it as a victory.
They immediately filed a motion to alter or amend, putting their teacher
quality, curriculum, transportation, facilities, and various other claims back
before the court. The claims were once again rejected by the trial judge, but the
plaintiffs' motion shows how far they viewed his order to be from the full
funding reform remedy they sought.133
Although the supreme court's decision forced him to adjudicate the case,
the trial judge's later opinions indicate a continuing concern with judicial
interference in this arena. While reluctant to interject into the legislature's
larger funding decisions, the trial judge responded to the supreme court's
demand that he hear the case by mandating preschool, a remedy that, although
likely to necessitate some additional spending, leaves the legislature
considerable discretion in shaping and implementing an early childhood
program. Although not the pure legislative deference adopted by the New York
court, the South Carolina judge selected a remedy that would allow him to
avoid the question of specific appropriations. In fact, by choosing to mandate
preschool rather than increased funding for the system as a whole, the judge in
a sense echoed the earliest adequacy decisions that called for functioning
school systems, but left the details to the legislature. In order to respond to the
commands of the supreme court while avoiding legislative prerogatives, the
judge invented a remedy that brought him squarely back into comfortable
judicial territory. This type of cabined remedy can increasingly be expected of
trial judges skeptical of interfering with legislative budgetary allocations.
In the 2007 case, Moore v. State, an Alaska trial court similarly ordered a
nonmonetary remedy in lieu of the statewide funding reform sought by
plaintiffs. Although the trial court found not only that the state's "achievement
gap" was a serious concern,134 but also that the education provided in at least
one district was so deficient as to make it a violation of substantive due process
to require its students to pass the statewide exam in order to receive their high
school diplomas,135 it concluded that the plaintiffs proved neither that current
funding was constitutionally inadequate nor that an increase of funding would
remedy the existing achievement gap in the state.136 Suggesting that local
school districts had failed to spend existing funds in the best interest of their
132. Id. at 6.

133. See id. at 158-59.
134. Moore v. State, No. 3AN-04-9756, slip op. at 179 (Alaska Super. Ct. 2007).
135. Id. at 193.
136. Id. at 178-79.
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students, the court directed the legislature to step up its oversight of the system
and to ensure better accountability. 37 In reasoning resonant with the logic of
the No Child Left Behind Act, the court determined that the state was failing to
meet its constitutional mandate not for lack of funding, but due to a failure of
adequate oversight.
These recent opinions in Arizona, South Carolina, and Alaska demonstrate
three possible responses to education suits. Ranging from total rejection of
plaintiffs' claims, to a highly specific yet cabined remedy, to the vague
command to "increase oversight," they have in common the sense that money
will not solve a state's education problems. While courts may respond, as did
the Arizona court, by placing blame on parents rather than the state, or, as did
South Carolina and Alaska, by searching out a remedy that avoids an overt
mandate of increased spending, their skepticism about whether money will
solve problems contributes to the sense that the legislature is best positioned to
address modem education problems.
At a broader level, the cases in this Part show how important innovative
remedial proposals will be to the future success of education reform litigation.
By focusing on funding, plaintiffs may open a window for unsympathetic
courts to exempt themselves altogether from the process of reform. Even the
more engaged courts may draw the line of intervention at specific budgetary
allocations. Thus, when adequacy plaintiffs do not offer remedies that are not
overtly monetary, they may end up with a court that decides to defer to
legislative budget numbers or with a nonresponsive remedy.
C. Lessons from Adequacy Cases Across the Country
Finally, adequacy decisions delivered between 2005 and 2008 reflect
significant changes in the larger national landscape. In the previous Parts this
Article showed courts to be increasingly pushed-by maturing cases and
litigation strategies-toward mandating appropriations, a remedy with which
they were increasingly uncomfortable. This Part adds the backdrop: by 2005
courts had to weigh this uncertain justice against the risk that their actions
would begin a losing battle with the state legislature, or that, at best, judicial
interference would only contribute to the kind of mixed results seen over the
years in their own and other states.
In the early adequacy cases, courts were exploring new territory. They
recognized separation of powers tensions from the very beginning, but they
also saw the many ways in which education is sui generis. As a state's single
affirmative constitutional duty, education is elevated in state constitutions, as it
is in American life. In response to early rulings, legislatures could not, and did
not, reject outright the judiciary's insistence that they provide an adequate
education for all children.
137. Id. at 199.
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By 2007, plaintiffs had litigated adequacy cases in thirty-five states. As
discussed in Part I, many of the judicial decisions served as catalysts for
immediate sweeping education reform. In a handful of states, however, staunch
political opposition forced courts to play a more active role in the remediation
stage, straining the allocation of power among the branches and ultimately
shaking judicial commitment to protecting the constitutional right.138
These struggles during the 1990s portend for today's judges what may be
at stake when they preside over adequacy litigation. The history of education
litigation in Texas is particularly illustrative of what courts may fear when they
contemplate becoming deeply involved in an education remedy. The Texas
Supreme Court began its intervention in the state's failing education system
committed to the constitutional guarantee and to requiring the reforms
necessary to fulfill that guarantee. When the court unanimously struck down
the state's school finance system in 1989 in Edgewood I, it called for sweeping
legislative action, warning, "[a] band-aid will not suffice; the system itself must
be changed." 39 Two years later, in Edgewood II, the court continued to press
Texas to meet its duty to schoolchildren. The court unanimously struck down
the public school finance system a second time, dismissing the latest legislation
as wholly insufficient: "[T]he fundamental flaw .. . lies not in any particular
provisions but in its overall failure to restructure the system." 40 Four months
later, the legislature enacted new legislation, modeled closely on prescriptive
judicial advice.1 41 Not yet satisfied, however, the Court rejected the
legislature's effort yet again in Edgewood III, decided in January of 1992.142
The Texas Supreme Court accompanied each of its decisions with an
unbending injunction threatening to shut down the public school system if the
legislature failed to pass constitutional legislation by the designated deadline.
By Edgewood III, however, the court's unanimous front began to break under
mounting pushback from the legislature. 143 Finally, in Edgewood IV-facing
138. See Rebell, supra note 1, at 1528-29 (citing instances of "excessive delay and
resistance" by political branches that-in states like Ohio and Alabama-ultimately led
courts to retreat).
139. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood 1), 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex.
1989).
140. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood II), 804 S.W.2d 491, 500 (Tex.
1991) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court actually
reversed the district court's decision to vacate the injunction "on the equitable grounds of
deference to the Legislature." Id. at 494.
141. This advice was not-so-subtly slipped into an unnecessary opinion in Edgewoodil
denying a rehearing. Justice Doggett wrote a concurrence criticizing this inappropriate use of
the opinion denying a rehearing to "influence the final stages of current legislative
deliberations."Id. at 501.
142. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist.
(Edgewood III), 826 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1992).
143. In his dissent, Justice Mauzy-who had written the Edgewood I decision-wrote,
"In two prior opinions on this same case, the court worked together to follow the rather clear
command of the Constitution without regard to the political consequences of its decision.
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the legislature's threat to strip its jurisdiction 44-the court declared the school
finance system constitutional.
By the account of the four dissenting justices, Edgewood IV was the result
of a capitulation to political pressure. They denied that anything substantive
had changed since the court's ruling in Edgewood I. Writing for the dissent,
Justice Hecht explained: "Today, despite the court's admonition that systemic
change is essential, made in Edgewood , and repeated in Edgewood II, and the
legislature's three opportunities in as many years to comply with constitutional
1 45
requirements, the basic system with its fundamental flaws remain intact."
And, by the majority's own admission, its dramatic departure from former
precedent was motivated by the need to escape the "judicial purgatory where
[w]e must hear the same case over and over.",146 This claim, first expressed by
Justice Cornyn in his one-justice dissent in Edgewood III, was adopted by the
majority in Edgewood IV, 147 perhaps because it promised a graceful exit from a
situation that had become untenable due to political pressure.
This epic battle left its mark on the Texas judiciary long after its final
Edgewood decision. Although by the time Neeley v. West Orange Cove
ConsolidatedIndependent School Districtreached the Texas Supreme Court in
December of 2005, only Justice Hecht remained on the court from the
Edgewood cases, his experience clearly informed the court's response to
Neeley. Now writing for the Neeley majority, Justice Hecht vigorously
defended the court's duty to determine the constitutionality of the public school
system. At the same time, he ultimately engaged in the inquiry with
pronounced deference to the legislature. Bound by the lower court's factual
findings, Justice Hecht reversed the lower court's holding by taking the teeth
out of the standards applied. 148 He ruled that in addition to proving that the
Through compromise and consensus-building, the court spoke with one firm voice in what
many have recognized as the most important case it has ever considered. Tragically, this has
all been lost." Id. at 539 (Mauzy, J., dissenting).
144. See Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 20, at 702 ("Had it struck down Senate Bill
7, there might have been a revolt in the Legislature, particularly among the legislative
leaders who had invested so much into the creation of the law. House leader Libby
Linebarger surmised that, had the court declared Senate Bill 7 unconstitutional, the
Culberson amendment would have passed, sharply restricting the court's jurisdiction over
education-related issues.").
145. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno (Edgewood IV), 917 S.W.2d 717, 760 (Tex.
1995) (citations omitted).
146. Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d, at 526 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
147. See Edgewood IV, 917 S.W. at 766 (Spector, J., dissenting).
148. While the Texas Supreme Court adopted the duty articulated by the district
court-that a constitutional school system must provide all students "with a meaningful
opportunity to acquire the essential knowledge and skills reflected in . . . curriculum
requirements . . . such that upon graduation, students are prepared to 'continue to learn in
postsecondary educational, training, or employment settings"'-it significantly softened the
standard with the following caveat: "The public education system need not operate perfectly;
it is adequate if districts are reasonably able to provide their students the access and
opportunity the district court described." Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch.
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system is [currently] not producing a "general diffusion of knowledge," the
plaintiffs must prove that it is incapable of doing so. 149 Not surprisingly, the
plaintiffs failed to meet a burden of proof that was, by the court's own
admission, "very deferential to the legislature." 150 Thus, although the court
recognized serious deficiencies in education-including "wide gaps in
performance among student groups differentiated by race, proficiency in
5
English, and economic advantage" 1'-it
determined that "those
deficiencies
152
clause].",
education
Texas
[the
of
violation
a
to
amount
do not
This long saga in Texas, and similar experiences in a handful of other
states, 153 have undoubtedly influenced subsequent courts trying adequacy
cases. This is not surprising since state courts are especially likely to value the
experience of sister jurisdictions when faced with novel constitutional claims
and new remedial challenges not addressed by the federal courts.1 54 At the
same time, it means that over time, a few notable failures may have a
disproportionate impact on judges dealing with later litigation.
For example, in 2006, the Kansas Supreme Court foreclosed further
adequacy litigation explicitly to avoid the fate of its sister states."' In Montoy
v. State, the Court "elect[ed] ... to end th[e] litigation," despite lingering
doubts about whether the legislature had successfully created a constitutional
school finance system.156 In one prong of its decision, the court held that it
Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 787 (Tex. 2005) (quoting TEX. EDUC. CODE § 28.001).
149. Id. at 789.
150. Id. at 790.
151. Id. at 789 ("There are wide gaps in performance among student groups
differentiated by race, proficiency in English, and economic advantage. Non-completion and
dropout rates are high, and the loss of students who are struggling may make performance
measures applied to those who continue appear better than they should. The rate of students
meeting college preparedness standards is very low. There is also evidence of high attrition
and turnover among teachers statewide, due to increasing demands and stagnant
compensation.").
152. Id. at 754.
153. See Rebell, supranote 1, at 1501-05.
154. See William S. Koski, The Politics of Judicial Decision-Making in Education
Policy Reform Litigation, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1077, 1226 (2004) ("What affects state supreme
court decision-making in educational finance reform litigation? From a formal legal
viewpoint, judicial decision-making in school finance reform cases, like all judicial decisionmaking, should be based on a straightforward application of the law to the facts of the case.
But the law is hardly determinative in educational finance reform cases. Many of these cases
are cases of first impression in which a state's high court is interpreting vague and centuryold state constitutional language. Law and legal precedent being of limited explanatory
value, this study looks outside the law for influences on judicial decision-making.").
155. Montoy v. State, 138 P.3d 755, 765 (Kan. 2006).
156. Id. at 765 (finding that the most recent legislation "so fundamentally altered the
school funding formula that the school finance formula that was at issue in this case no
longer exists" (emphasis added), the court held it could not determine the constitutionality of
such without further fact-finding by a lower court. At the same time, the court refused to
remand to the district court to allow plaintiffs to amend their pleading to challenge the new
funding formula. Thus, the court provided no substantive response to plaintiffs' claims that
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could not properly determine the constitutionality of recently-passed legislation
that had made changes to the school finance system. It deemed the changes
significant enough to require that the plaintiffs amend their complaint in order
to continue to properly challenge the system.' 5 7 In the second prong, after
surveying the progression of adequacy suits in sixteen sister states, the court
declined to allow plaintiffs to amend their complaint to properly challenge the
constitutionality of the "new" school finance system.158 The court offered the
experiences of New Jersey, Arkansas, and Texas as empirical evidence that
remanding to the trial court tends to delay success in the face of continued
litigation. 159 Thus, the Supreme Court dismissed the case, concluding that "[a]
constitutional challenge . . . must wait for another day."1 60
Courts in other states have used a similar rationale for rejecting adequacy
suits or denying relief. In Hancock, for example, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts pointed to the other states, this time New Jersey and New York,
as evidence for why it should stay its hand in 2005.161 Likewise, in 2007, the
Alaska trial court in Moore pointed to Arkansas's experience as "illustrative"
of why it should deny plaintiffs' claims of inadequate funding.162
In still other states, courts have explicitly cited recent experiences from
around the country as grounds for avoiding adequacy litigation altogether. In
dismissing plaintiffs' claims as nonjusticiable in their 2007 case, Nebraska
Coalition for Educational Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, the Nebraska
Supreme Court went out of its way to chastise state courts that foolishly took
up what it deemed to be a prohibited political question: "The landscape is
littered with courts that have been bogged down in the legal quicksand of
continuous litigation and challenges to their states' school funding systems.
Unlike those courts, we refuse to wade into that Stygian swamp.,,163 The court
followed with a scathing critique of its peers in Arkansas, Texas, Alabama, and
New Jersey for mistakenly believing the judicial branch could bring meaningful
resolution and reform to school finance systems.164 In particular, the court
minced no words in rebuking the New Jersey courts for nearly twenty-five
years of school finance litigation, quoting a Rhode Island court's description of
the New Jersey litigation: "'[t]he volume of litigation and the extent of judicial
the amended legislation still failed to pass constitutional muster.).
157. Montoy v. State, 62 P.3d 228 (Kan. 2003).
158. Id. at 230.
159. Id. at 231.

160. Montoy, 138 P.3d at 762. Two dissenting judges criticize the majority for
"graft[ing] a 'good enough for government work' phrase onto Article 6 § 6 of our state
constitution." Id. at 771.
161. Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134 (2005).
162. Moore v. State, No. 3AN-04-9756, slip. op. at 154 (Alaska Super. Ct. June 21,
2007).
163. Neb. Coalition for Ed. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164, 183
(Neb. 2007).
164. Id.
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oversight provide a chilling example of65the thickets that can entrap a court that
takes on the duties of a [1]egislature."'1
Whether courts explicitly acknowledged their influence or not, the
landscape of prior education litigation across the country and its aftermath
cannot help but have informed all cases decided between 2005 and 2008. It is
not coincidental that in each and every instance where the question of adequacy
was one of first impression, courts between 2005 and 2008 dismissed plaintiffs'
claims. To put this in perspective, consider that at least four courts dismissed
adequacy claims on grounds of justiciability between 2005 and 2008,166
whereas only five courts had done so in the preceding sixteen. 167
A closer look at each of these recent dismissals, reveals judges deeply
concerned about their institutional competence to deal with the questions
presented, a worry that seems to be reinforced by the similar skepticism coming
out of other state courts. For example, in Oklahoma Education Association v.
State, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma dismissed plaintiffs' claims that the
state had failed to adequately fund the public school system as a nonjusticiable
political question. The Court reprimanded plaintiffs for "attempting to
circumvent the legislative process by . . . [ask]ing . .. this Court to invade the

Legislature's power to determine policy," and concluded, "[t]his we are
constitutionally prohibited from doing."1 68 Likewise, the Indiana trial court in
Bonner v. Daniels delivered an extremely brief opinion dismissing plaintiffs'
claims as contrary to separation of powers doctrine.1 69
Similarly, the plaintiffs' claims in Lobato v. State were dismissed on
justiciability grounds in 2006.170 Notably, the Colorado Supreme Court had
previously adjudicated a constitutional challenge to the education system. In
Lujan v. Colorado State Board ofEducation, an equal protection suit, the court
had "interpret[ed] the Education Clause ... [and] applied its interpretation to

165. Id. (quoting City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 59 (R.I. 1995)).
166. See Lobato v. State, No. 05CV4794, slip op. at 2-3 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Mar. 2, 2006),
aff'd, 216 P.3d 29 (Colo. App. 2008), rev'd, No. 08SC185 (Colo. Oct. 19, 2009); Bonner v.
Daniels, No. 49D010604PL016414, slip op. at 4 (Ind. Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2007); Neb.
Coalition for Educ. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164, 183 (Neb. 2007);
Okla. Educ. Ass'n v. State, 158 P.3d 1058, 1065 (Okla. 2007). As is described in greater
detail below, many other cases were dismissed for justiciability concerns, if not explicitly on
justiciability grounds. See, e.g., Carroll Hall v. Rell, No. X09CV054019406, 2007 WL
2938295, at *12 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 17, 2007); Young v. Williams, No. 03-CI-00055 &
03-CI-01 152 at 20 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Feb. 13, 2007); Pendleton School Dist. 16R v. State 200

P.3d 133, 145 (Or. 2009) (holding that plaintiffs claims were justiciable, but that the
funding system meets the constitutional requirement).

167. See Ex Parte James, 836 So. 2d 813, 819 (Ala. 2002); Coal. for Adequacy &
Fairness in Sch. Funding v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 408 (Fla. 1996); Comm. for Educ.
Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191 (111.1996); Marrero v. Commonwealth, 739 A.2d
110, 113 (Pa. 1999); City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 58 (R.I. 1995).

168. Okla. Educ. Ass'n, 158 P.3d at 1066.
169. Bonner, No. 49D010604PL016414, slip op. at 4.
170. Lobato, at No. 05CV4794, slip op. at 2-3.
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the public school finance system."' 7 ' Although asked to do the same for the
very same provision, the Lobato trial court drew a bright line between equal
and adequate opportunity claims and dismissed the latter as a political question
to be addressed by the legislature.172
And finally, in September 2007, a Connecticut trial court dismissed the
73
plaintiffs' claims to "suitable" educational opportunity in a pretrial motion.1
Judge Shortall clearly shared many of the concerns expressed by his peers in
Nebraska, Oklahoma, Indiana, and Colorado. However, bound by precedent
from the state's highest court on the justiciability of such cases, he could not
follow their lead. Thus constrained, Judge Shortall technically faulted plaintiffs
for failure to state a claim in a thinly veiled justiciability decision. The judge
imported his concerns about the proper role of the judiciary into the analysis
under the title "prudential cautions."' 74 Judge Shorthall claimed his "prudential
cautions" concerns were part of the Geisler test traditionally employed by
75
Connecticut courts to construe the contours of a state constitutional right.1 A
close reading of his opinion shows, however, that his "prudential cautions" map
171. Appellants' Opening Brief, Lobato v. Colo., 216 P.3d 29 (Colo. App. 2008) (No.
06CA733) (discussing Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982)).
172. Despite Plaintiffs' assertion that the Colorado Supreme Court has exercised jurisdiction over
Education Clause claims, these cases presented constitutional questions of equality, not quality or
adequacy of educational funding. In fact, no Colorado court has defined 'adequate' or 'thorough'
because the substance of these terms is a legislative determination.
Lobato, No. 05CV4794, slip op. at 2. Just as this article was receiving its final edits, the
Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion overturning the court of appeals' holding that
claims regarding education quality and adequacy of the state's public school financing are
nonjusticiable political questions. The Court seemed, however, to require that, on remand,
the court of appeals perform rational basis review to determine the constitutionality of the
school financing system. The Court held, "the judiciary must . . . evaluate whether the
current state's public school financing system is funded and allocated in a manner rationally
related to the constitutional mandate." Lobato v. State, No. 08SCl85, slip op. at 40 (Colo.
Oct. 19, 2009). It will be interesting to see how the trial court responds to a remand that
cautions it to "give significant deference to the legislature's fiscal and policy judgments" and
instructs that it may "appropriately rely on the legislature's own pronouncements to develop
the meaning of a 'thorough and uniform' system of education." Id. at 42.
173. Carroll-Hall v. Rell, No. X09CV054019406, 2007 WL 2938295 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Sept. 17, 2007).
174. Id. at *12 ("While the court has rejected the state's argument that the questions
raised by plaintiffs are not justiciable, it cannot ignore the 'prudential cautions [which] shed
light on the proper definition of constitutional rights and remedies."' The Connecticut
Supreme Court heard oral argument on the interlocutory appeal of Judge Shorthall's ruling
in April of 2008. In April of 2009, the court informed the parties that the two members who
did not hear oral argument in the case would participate in the decision. The court has yet to
issue a ruling as of the date of writing.
175. See State v. Geisler, 610 A.2d 1225, 1232 (Conn. 1992) (specifying six "tools of
analysis" to be considered in construing the contours of the Connecticut Constitution: "(1)
the textual approach, (2) holdings and dicta of this court, and the Appellate Court, (3) federal
precedent, (4) sister state decisions or sibling approach, (5) the historical approach, including
the historical constitutional setting and the debates of the framers, and (6)
economic/sociological considerations." (citations omitted)).
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perfectly onto the classic justiciability case, Baker v. Carr.176 Further, neither
Geisler-nor any case before or after-introduces a justiciability analysis as a
step in defining the contours of a constitutional right.177 Judge Shortall's
strange manipulation of the Geisler test therefore suggests that, as in other
states recently dismissing adequacy suits, justiciability concerns actually drove
the judge's decision.17
176. The Court's arguments map onto the Baker v. Carr criteria as follows: 1) A
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to coordinate political
department ("The holders of public office at both [the state and regional] levels and in both
the executive and legislative branches of government have the constitutional responsibility to
determine what is necessary to provide a free and substantially equal educational opportunity
.... Courts 'must resist the temptation ... to enhance [their] own constitutional authority by
trespassing upon an area clearly reserved as the prerogative of a coordinate branch of
government.' Carroll-Hall, 2007 WL 2938295, at *11); 2) The lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the issue ("In order to determine
whether the allegations of the complaint are true, the court would have to receive evidence
concerning and determining such questions as: What is a 'high quality preschool?'; What are
'appropriate class sizes?'; . . . What makes up a 'rigorous curriculum with a wide breath of
courses?' . . . Stating explicitly what is implicit in the plaintiffs' argument makes it plain
how far afield from the courts' constitutional function of hearing and deciding cases their
complaint would take the court." Id. at *12); 3) The impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion ("[M]any and varied
issues of educational policy . . . are involved in defining a 'substantive level of educational
opportunity' .

. .

. Decisions of the Supreme Court subsequent to Horton I demonstrate that

Court's reluctance to insert itself into educational policy decisions in the absence of clear
constitutional or legislative authority to do so." Id. at *6); and 4) The impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government without disregarding legislature's exclusive authority.
("An examination of the complaint in this case makes it evident how deep an intrusion by the
court into the constitutional prerogatives of the other branches of state government, to say
nothing of local boards of education, would be necessary to grant plaintiffs the relief they
seek." Id. at *12.)
177. Judge Shorthall's decision would have been telling had it merely attempted to
masquerade justiciability concerns as "prudential cautions." Id. at * 12. However, "prudential
cautions"s-let alone justiciability-are not, in fact, a part of the traditional test used to
define the contours of a constitutional right. Id. at *5. The precedent cited by Judge Shorthall
identified "economic/sociological considerations," not prudential cautions, as the sixth tool
of a constitutional rights analysis. Moreover, the "tool" is not just different in name. Id. at
*5. "Economic/sociological considerations" in the Geisler inquiry instructs courts to
recognize constitutional prohibitions even beyond the letter of the constitutional provisions
themselves, when allowing the act would-in practice-undermine the core right. For
example, in Geisler the Supreme Court of Connecticut construed the exclusionary rule
broadly to exclude all evidence derived from an unlawful warrantless entry into the homeincluding evidence obtained while the defendant is in lawful custody outside of the hometo eliminate incentives for the police to conduct unconstitutional search and seizures.
Geisler, 610 A.2d at 1237.
178. Importantly, only the decisions in Oklahoma and Nebraska were final decisions
before the state's highest court. Each of the other cases-in Indiana, Colorado, Connecticut,
and Oregon-is being or had been appealed. Future appellate court decisions may very well
direct reluctant lower courts to take on these daunting cases-as they have in the past. See,
e.g., Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724 (Idaho 1993); Montoy
v. State, 62 P.3d 228 (Kan. 2003); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375 (N.H.
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CONCLUSION: MOVING BEYOND JUSTICIABILITY

The recent shift in outcomes for adequacy plaintiffs this Article
describes-toward judicial restraint at the remedial phase, findings of
nonjusticiability, and deference to legislative budget allocations-is instructive
for those who look to the courts to fight for children in failing schools. The
affirmative state right to education is a vital tool precisely because of the
tendency of majority politics to leave behind the voiceless. Children growing
up with grossly inadequate educational opportunities are exactly those citizens
whom courts must protect. This Article has shown that continuing to tread the
paths carved and refined by three decades of adequacy litigation has ceased to
bring plaintiffs closer to the goal of producing tangible improvements for those
children. Rather than producing desperately needed change in state education
policy, recent adequacy litigation has encountered mounting resistance and
fueled separation of powers fears that may ultimately leave the courts
altogether unwilling to intervene in the area of education. In doing so, it is
jeopardizing the very right that extends so much promise to this country's
children, no matter their race or socioeconomic background. Modem adequacy
litigation-as we know it-may have run its course.
But, all is not lost. To the contrary, this precarious situation gives
education advocates a mandate to think critically about the past evolution of the
adequacy litigation strategy and creatively about the way forward. Courts have
shown themselves reluctant to wholly relinquish their authority to adjudicate
the education right and generally have not done so to this point.
One thing recent decisions make clear is that plaintiffs must find a way to
recharacterize both the right and the remedy so that they cannot be boiled down
to a demand for increased funding. Scholars and courts have already begun to
explore a handful of legally and politically plausible nonmonetary alternatives.
The recent South Carolina decision suggests one way forward.179 Because early
education programs have been shown nearly to guarantee a boost in the
academic achievement of at-risk students while leaving the legislature and
localities with significant discretion in how to structure such a program,
universal preschool is a particularly appealing nonmonetary remedy.s 0 That
the South Carolina court elected to adopt a remedy of mandatory preschool
shows how realistic an option it is to structure future litigation around such
nonmonetary remedial requests. At the same time, universal preschool is
certainly not the only possible remedy that could avoid throwing courts directly
into the arena of appropriations. This example hints at a whole universe of
cases that might target critical elements of an adequate education.
Nonmonetary remedies need not be incremental. In fact, one of the boldest
1993); Abbeville v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540-41 (S.C. 1999).
179. See Abbeville, 515 S.E.2d at 540-41.
180. See, e.g., James E. Ryan, A ConstitutionalRight to Preschool?, 94 CAL. L. REV.
49, 61 (2006).
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proposals to date steers clear of the legislature's power of the purse while
arguing for drastic reform. Professor James Ryan has made the case that the
education clauses enshrined in state constitutions guarantee children the right to
a socio-economically integrated education. 1 Similarly, others have argued
that an "adequate" education requires carefully targeted school choice.182
Finally, courts may be able to avoid directing fiscal and educational policy
by instead focusing on the process by which that policy is determined. Scholars
have proposed the judiciary play a role more akin to a "catalyst" or "backstop"
than "dictator" in structural reform litigation. 8 The most recent Wyoming
decision provides an initial sense of what a process-focused remedial role
might look like in the education context.184
Identifying new litigation strategies that can work in the present climate
will not be easy. Courts' separation of powers concerns are deeply rooted and
their relationships with their legislatures are complex. Structural reform
litigation to some extent will inevitably demand that courts take an unusually
active role in crafting a remedy. In trying to give wide berth to the legislature's
spending power, courts may risk encroaching on the prerogative of local
control. However, unless courts are presented with avenues for remediation that
do not force them to encroach on the legislature's appropriations prerogative,
they may allow the right to erode irrevocably by paying it lip service while
abdicating their role in guaranteeing its substance.
There is another, perhaps an equally compelling reason for plaintiffs to
look away from funding at this juncture. Whereas when equity suits first
pressed for increased school funding, the lack of money was by far the greatest
barrier to an adequate education, today this is no longer the case. Although
adequate funding is undoubtedly one part of providing adequate educational
181. See Ryan, supra note 16, at 307; see also Christopher E. Adams, Is Economic
Integrationin the Fourth Wave in School FinanceLitigation?, 56 EMORY L.J. 1613 (2007).
182. See, e.g., Brief of Appellant at 7, Crawford v. Davy, No. C-137-06 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 2007).
183. See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial
Intervention in Prisons, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 805, 811 (1990).
184. See Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 181 P.3d 43, 59 (Wyo. 2008). In 2001,
the Supreme Court handed down a very detailed remedy. Id. at 48. It instructed the
legislature not only in the factors they needed to take into consideration in creating the
formula used to calculate the cost of a constitutional education, but it also mandated explicit
levels of funding for kindergarten and capital construction. Id. at 59. By contrast, in 2008, in
deciding whether or not the legislature had fully complied, the Court looked-at times-to
the process by which the legislature had decided on its course of action and the facts that
informed its decisions. For example, the court's assessment of the sufficiency of funding for
at-risk students turned on the fact that the "state [had] exerted significant effort to develop a
fair and accurate method of estimating the additional cost of addressing at-risk students."
Campbell County, 2008 WY at 52. Similarly, the Court upheld the level of funding for small
schools because the State had replaced arbitrary cut-offs with an adjustment "revised on the
basis of ... data and applied in a consistent manner." Id. at 45, 61; see also Abbott v. Burke,
971 A.2d 989, 1007 (N.J. 2009) (scrutinizing methodology for creation of new state funding
scheme before finding it constitutional).
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opportunity, experience has taught that money alone will never be enough to
guarantee that such opportunities are present. For both normative and strategic
reasons, then, it is vital that adequacy campaigners shift their focus away from
funding and toward more judicially enforceable iterations of the right.
There is no obvious answer to this problem, nor does this Article attempt to
suggest one. Whether it be conceiving of education as a procedural right or
framing it as the right to some minimum set of nonmonetary entitlements such
as preschool, the way forward for education suits will no doubt be difficult.
Despite the difficulty, however, path-breaking new strategies must be sought
before they are found. Education is too important a part of this country's
promise and its future to ignore the signs that current litigation strategies have
reached the end of their usefulness.
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